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Preface
This dissertation work provides a kaleidoscope of alternative empirical estimation
techniques while illuminating and challenging conventional approaches and estab-
lished findings in the Corporate Finance literature. In particular, the observed
“conglomerate discount” and the effect of diversification and concentrated owner-
ship on firm value are revisited in the course of my cumulated doctoral thesis. In
doing so, the main emphasis lies on the inference of causation in the presence of
endogeneity concerns, namely by considering potential distortions caused by un-
observed heterogeneity, reverse causality or non-random self-selection. The thesis
comprises the following four papers:
Chapter Title
1 A Corporate Finance Application of the Oaxaca-Blinder
Decomposition: Causes of the Diversification Discount
2 A Paradoxon of Policy Intervention:
The Case of the German Tax Reduction Act
3 Good Matches Last Longer – Unobserved Heterogeneity
across Firm-Owner Matches
4 About Estimating Gains from Diversification and
Why Firms Self-select
ii
Acknowledgements
There are many people without whom this dissertation would not have been pos-
sible, and to whom I am greatly indebted.
First and foremost, I would like to express my sincerest gratitude to Professor
Dr. Bernhard Schwetzler, who has supported me throughout my thesis with his
patience and knowledge whilst granting me the room to discover and to live up
my academic interests. I would also like to thank Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Althammer
for being the second assessor of my doctoral thesis.
I am particularly grateful for the extraordinary time I had with my immediate
colleagues, which was characterized by mutual support, encouragement and in-
spiration in the small and larger things of academic and daily life. This positive
working environment provided me the touch of lightness which is needed to dare
to think differently. Big thanks to Christin Rudolph, Max Schreiter and Alexandra
Holzey! My special thanks are extended to Alexander Lahmann, who is the most
passionate and supportive research fellow I can imagine. Moreover, I am thankful
for Benjamin Hammer, Sven Arnold, Alexander Knauer, Matthias Tischner, Ma-
gnus Pflu¨cke, Johannes Reusche, Susanne Knoll and Hannes Kaltenbrunner for
walking with me along this path. I wish to acknowledge the strong dedication and
valuable research support provided by Sebastian Voigt. Thanks also goes to Laura
Thomas for proofreading of this dissertation.
Finally, I would like to express my greatest gratitude towards my family for all
countless things having made possible. This work is dedicated to you!
iii
Table of Contents
List of Tables vii
1 A Corporate Finance Application of the Oaxaca-Blinder De-
composition: Causes of the Diversification Discount 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 Corporate diversification and its agency-related costs . . . . . 4
1.3 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as an approach to explain-
ing the excess value gap . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.1 Pooled sample OLS decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.3.2 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.4 Sample selection and description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.1 Sample selection and variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4.2 Sample description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Empirical analysis and discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5.1 Basic results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.2 Robustness tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
1.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2 A Paradoxon of Policy Intervention: The Case of the German
Tax Reduction Act 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2 The Tax Reduction Act of 2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.1 Investor View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.3.2 Investee View . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.4 Data and Descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.1 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
iv
2.4.3 Identification Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.5 Estimation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.1 The Effect of the Tax Reform on Ownership Concen-
tration and Firm Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.5.2 The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Firm Value 63
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.8 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
3 GoodMatches Last Longer – Unobserved Heterogeneity across
Firm-Owner Matches 80
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.2 Estimation Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.1 Empirical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.2 Error Decomposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.2.3 The OLS Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.4 The Instrumental Variable (IV )-Approach . . . . . . . 88
3.2.5 Prediction of Bias Direction and Relevance . . . . . . . 89
3.3 Data and Sample Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3.1 Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3.2 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
3.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.4.1 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration . . . . . 92
3.4.2 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration by Owner
Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.6 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.7 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
4 About estimating gains from diversification and why firms
self-select 109
v
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.2 Modelling gains from diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.2.1 Potential outcomes and switching regressions . . . . . . 114
4.2.2 Expected firm values and selection bias . . . . . . . . . 117
4.2.3 Diversification gains and selection bias . . . . . . . . . 119
4.3 Modelling selection into diversification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
4.3.1 Selection according to highest expected outcome . . . . 122
4.3.2 Selection on expected gains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.4 Sample selection and descriptives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4.1 Sample selection and excess value measure . . . . . . . 125
4.4.2 Distribution of firm characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5.1 OLS and IV estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.5.2 Endogenous switching regression . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.7 Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
vi
List of Tables
1 A Corporate Finance Application of the Oaxaca-Blinder De-
composition: Causes of the Diversification Discount 1
1.1 Variable definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 Ownership characteristics of German firms . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.3 Development of ownership characteristics over time . . . . . . 29
1.4 Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis . . . . . . . 30
1.5 Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition: Ultimate ownership (10%) . . 31
1.6 Robustness tests (I): 20% control threshold . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.7 Robustness tests (II): Coefficient weights . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.8 Robustness tests (III): Alternative divergence measures . . . . 34
1.9 Robustness tests (IV): Endogeneity concerns . . . . . . . . . . 35
2 A Paradoxon of Policy Intervention: The Case of the German
Tax Reduction Act 43
2.1 Development of ownership concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2 Changes in ownership concentration across owner types from
2001 to 2002 (tax reform period) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.3 Block trades from 2001 to 2002 (tax reform period) . . . . . . 69
2.4 Block trades from 2000 to 2001 (pre-tax reform period) . . . . 70
2.5 Development of block trades over time . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.6 Differences in means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.7 Effect of the tax reform on concentration and firm value . . . 72
2.8 Effect of ownership concentration adjustment on firm value
(log Tobin’s Q) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.9 Variable definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3 GoodMatches Last Longer – Unobserved Heterogeneity across
Firm-Owner Matches 80
3.1 Direction and relevance of bias stemming from firm and match
heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
vii
3.3 Distribution of average control concentration (in %) and av-
erage match duration (in years) over owner types . . . . . . . 99
3.4 Distribution of average control concentration (in %) over firm-
owner match duration (in years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.5 Development of average control concentration (in %) by total
observed firm-owner match duration (in years) . . . . . . . . . 100
3.6 Cumulative effect of control concentration (conc.) on Tobin’s
Q evaluated at different control concentration levels – OLS
and IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.7 Cumulative effect of control concentration (conc.) on Tobin’s
Q by owner types evaluated at different control concentration
levels – OLS and IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.8 Variable definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4 About estimating gains from diversification and why firms
self-select 109
4.1 Expected excess values and diversification gains . . . . . . . . 135
4.2 Roy model predictions and sorting mechanisms. Selection ac-
cording to highest expected outcome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3 Distribution of firm-year observations and excess value over
time (1992-2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.4 Summary statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
4.5 Parameter estimates of diversification decision and excess value
equations. Reduced set of control variables . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.6 Parameter estimates of diversification decision and excess value
equations. Extended set of control variables . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.7 Linearly predicted excess values using estimates of endogenous
switching regressions: Diversification and heterogeneity gains.
Reduced specification model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.8 Linearly predicted excess values using estimates of endogenous
switching regressions: Diversification and heterogeneity gains.
Extended specification model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
viii
1 A Corporate Finance Application of the
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: Causes of
the Diversification Discount
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A Corporate Finance Application of the
Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition: Causes of the
Diversification Discount∗
Markus Brendel†, Christin Rudolph, and Bernhard Schwetzler
HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Germany
Abstract
We promote the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as a new empiri-
cal approach to corporate finance-related research. Originated in labor
economics, its primary field of application is the examination of gender
and race-related wage gaps. Allowing for an in-depth analysis of fac-
tors driving valuation differences between two distinctive groups, the
method likewise provides an effective tool for corporate finance topics.
We demonstrate its usefulness on the basis of an old yet still up-to-
date problem, namely the value discount associated with corporate
diversification. In particular, we aim to disentangle how the different
agency conflicts – the one between the corporate manager and share-
holders and the other between majority and minority shareholders –
work on the discount. Using a sample of CDAX firms from 2000 to
2009, we find the latter conflict to be the driving agency-related cost.
JEL classification: G31, G32, G34
Key words: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition · diversification discount · agency costs
∗Article history: This paper benefited from conversations with participants of the 2013
Annual Conference of the Multinational Finance Society (MFS) in Izmir (Turkey), the
2013 Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF) in Wuppertal, the 2014
Annual VHB-Meeting in Leipzig and the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Midwestern Finance
Association (MFA) in Orlando (USA).
†Corresponding author; email: markus.brendel@hhl.de.
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1.1 Introduction
The Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition is an established approach in social
science, mostly applied to describe gender and race discrimination in wages
(Blinder (1973), Oaxaca (1973), Oaxaca and Ransom (1994)). The wage
differential between two groups of individuals is divided into an ‘explained’
part due to differences in the endowment of characteristics (e.g. the more
work experience, the higher the salary) and an ‘unexplained’ component
due to differences in the effects of characteristics (e.g. men and women,
despite having the same level of work experience, are rewarded differently);
the latter part is often used as a measure of discrimination. Beyond that,
the methodology has proven to be useful in a variety of other research fields,
such as education (Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011)), marketing (Vilchez (2012)),
economics (Wei (2005)), and accounting (Clatworthy et al. (2009)).1
This paper introduces the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as a new ap-
proach to corporate finance-related research. The technique provides an in-
sightful view on factors causing valuation differences between two distinctive
groups (e.g. firms with different organizational structures or firms in different
industries or countries) and allows quantifying the contribution of each factor
to the respective value gap. In contrast to conventional OLS regression, it
accounts for between-group differences in the effects of variables.
We demonstrate the applicability and usefulness of the decomposition
method on the basis of an old yet pervasive topic – the phenomenon of the
diversification discount. More precisely, we exemplarily adopt the approach
to study the mechanisms driving the valuation differential between diversified
1Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011) study the reasons behind the large increase in Indonesia’s
PISA score from 2003 to 2006. They analyze how much of the test score increase was caused
by changes in students’ characteristics (‘explained’ difference) and how much was due to
policy or system changes (‘unexplained’ difference). Vilchez (2012) investigates which
part of the hotel price can be explained by differences in the characteristics of hotels in
different tourist areas (‘explained’ effect), and which part can be attributed to differences
in destination branding (‘unexplained’ effect). Wei (2005) explores the country-specific
determinants of FDI inflows in China and India and the causes for their huge difference;
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is used to quantify the contribution of the determinants in
explaining the gap. Clatworthy et al. (2009) employ the decomposition method to explain
the premium on audit fees charged by Big Four auditors relative to non-Big Four auditors.
3
and standalone firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews
the literature associated with the conglomerate discount and its underlying
causes. In Section 3, we introduce the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as
an alternative to conventional OLS estimation in explaining the value gap
between diversified and standalone firms. Section 4 describes the data set and
main variables. We present and discuss the results of the empirical analysis
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Corporate diversification and its agency-related
costs
The question of whether corporate diversification destroys shareholder wealth
has been the subject of a long-lasting and heated academic debate. Berger
and Ofek (1995) were among the first U.S.-based studies to show that con-
glomerates, on average, trade at a discount compared to standalone firms.
Their excess value model has become the standard method for studying the
value implications of diversification. Excess value is defined as the natu-
ral logarithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual market value to an imputed
value based on a matched portfolio of standalones; a negative difference
in mean excess values between conglomerates and standalones implies that
diversification reduces value, a positive difference indicates a premium on
conglomeration. Many other researchers adopted this ‘chop-shop’ valuation
approach, confirming a discount on U.S. conglomerates for a variety of other
data sets and periods (Servaes (1996), Burch and Nanda (2003), Ahn and
Denis (2004)). Studies going beyond U.S. borders, however, have shown that
the discount is far from being an overarching phenomenon. In contrast, they
suggest the value of diversification to be dependent on countries’ economic
and regulatory settings (Lins and Servaes (1999, 2002), Fauver et al. (2003),
Rudolph and Schwetzler (2013)). The debate has additionally been fueled
by scholars addressing methodological concerns. Some argue that the link
between diversification and value is not causal but rather driven by endoge-
nous firm choices (Campa and Kedia (2002), Graham et al. (2002), Villalonga
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(2004)); others claim the discount to be biased by measurement error (Mansi
and Reeb (2002)). Latest research, however, shows that accounting for these
methodological issues may reduce the discount but does not eliminate it
(Glaser and Mu¨ller (2010), Ammann et al. (2012), Hoechle et al. (2012)).
The evidence on the discount has also found acceptance among practition-
ers; for example, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG), a global management
consulting firm, regularly publishes research reports, giving advice on how
to take advantage of being a conglomerate.2
The question of why diversified firms trade at a discount has been dis-
cussed just as intensively. Corporate diversification offers a variety of bene-
fits, allowing for economies of scope (Teece (1980), Panzar and Willig (1981)),
a higher debt capacity given the coinsurance effect across imperfectly corre-
lated divisions (Lewellen (1971)), and the availability of an alternative to
external financing in the form of an internal capital market (Stein (1997)).
However, on average, conglomerates are not able to exploit these benefits and
fail to appropriately control the costs associated with diversification. Their
inefficient capital allocation is viewed as a major cause of the discount. A
substantial number of studies find agency theory to lie at the heart of the
problem, arguing that corporate managers (CEO and alike) have a tendency
to overinvest out of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) and prefer to invest in in-
dustries where they are more experienced, as this makes them indispensable
(Shleifer and Vishny (1989)). Rent-seeking behavior by division managers
and internal power struggles among divisions further undermine the friction-
less functioning of the internal capital market (Rajan et al. (2000), Scharf-
stein and Stein (2000)). Scharfstein and Stein (2000)’s two-layer agency
model suggests that rent-seeking at the level of division managers does not
by itself generate inefficiencies in the allocation of investment capital but is
rather caused by the conflict between corporate managers and outside share-
holders. While shareholders prefer to compensate division managers with
cash, corporate managers – given their own misaligned incentives – view it
2E.g., “Managing for Value - How the World’s Top Diversified Companies Produce
Superior Shareholder Returns” (BCG Report, December 2006), “The Power of Diversified
Companies During Crises” (BCG Report, January 2012).
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less costly to grant preferential, potentially inefficient, capital funds instead
of cash payments. Overall, the majority of studies suggest the greater agency
costs of diversification to stem primarily from the corporate manager - out-
side shareholder conflict.
This paper challenges the traditional view and emphasizes another agency
conflict potentially contributing to the value differential between diversified
and standalone firms – namely the conflict between the majority shareholder
and minority shareholders. Looking at publicly traded companies in East
Asian markets, Claessens et al. (1999) find that firms’ diversification levels
are positively related to the degree of divergence of their ultimate owners’
control and cash flow rights and conclude that diversification is a means for
firms’ controlling shareholders to expropriate wealth from the non-controlling
ones. Lins and Servaes (2002) come to a similar result. Apart from that, the
majority - minority owner conflict has barely been considered for explaining
the conglomerate discount. Various studies investigate the impact of tun-
neling on emerging market business groups (Bertrand et al. (2002), Bae et
al. (2002), Almeida et al. (2011)), however, minority shareholder expropria-
tion has not yet received much attention with regard to its role in developed
market diversified firms. Thereby, in most countries the typical listed firm is
controlled by one or two large shareholders (Claessens et al. (2000), Faccio
and Lang (2002)); hence, it may be argued that the key conflict of interest
in such firms is not between corporate managers and shareholders but rather
between controlling and non-controlling owners.
Thus, we apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to study which of the
two agency conflicts – the one between the management and outside share-
holders or the other between majority and minority shareholders – is the
primary driver behind the excess value gap not attributable to observable
differences in the endowment of firm characteristics.
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1.3 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition as an approach
to explaining the excess value gap
In this section, we first reassess the pooled sample OLS estimation and outline
its generalizing approach in interpreting the valuation differential between
diversified and standalone firms. Second, we describe the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition and elaborate on why it provides a more insightful alternative
to conventional OLS regression. Finally, we address identification problems
attached to the OB approach.
1.3.1 Pooled sample OLS decomposition
To explain the widely observed excess value gap between conglomerates and
standalones, an additive linear relationship between excess value Y and its
predictor variables X is usually modeled and estimated by a pooled sample
OLS regression:
Yi = α +X
′
iβ + δDi + εi (1)
where X ′i denotes a 1×k vector of observed characteristics with a constant
α and the vector of slope coefficients β. The inclusion of a diversification
dummy Di, which takes on the value of one in case of a diversified firm,
serves the purpose to capture differences in the group effects of standalones
(α) and conglomerates (α + δ). As described above, the general consensus
among researchers and practitioners is that the costs of diversification – the
inefficiency of internal capital markets in particular – outweigh associated
benefits. This is argued to be manifested in a negative coefficient of the
diversification dummy (δ), usually referred to as diversification discount.
In order to reveal what conventional OLS estimation is able to explain of
the valuation differential, we start with a theoretical decomposition exercise.
For that, we subtract the expected excess value of standalones E[Yi|D = 0]
from that of diversified firms E[Yi|D = 1] to yield the excess value differential:
∆OLS0 = E[Yi|D = 1]− E[Yi|D = 0]. (2)
By the law of iterated expectations (LIE) and – assumed for demon-
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stration purposes – strong conditional mean independence of the error term
E[εi|X,D] = 0 ruling out endogeneity problems, the firm value differential
can be divided into the following components (Fortin et al. (2010)):
∆OLS0 = E[E(Yi|X,D = 1)|D = 1]− E[E(Yi|X,D = 0)|D = 0]
= E[(X ′iβ + δD)|D = 1]− E[(X ′iβ + δD)|D = 0]
= E[Xi|D = 1]β + δ − E[Xi|D = 0]β
= (E[Xi|D = 1]− E[Xi|D = 0])β︸ ︷︷ ︸ + δ︸︷︷︸
= ∆OLSX + ∆
OLS
C (3)
The first expression of the equation (∆OLSX ) represents the part of the ex-
cess value gap attributable to differing mean characteristics across both firm
groups. Although not visible to the researcher, this ‘explained’ part of the
value differential is controlled for in a conventional OLS estimation. In order
to identify the ‘true’ difference in group effects δ, coefficients β of factors
X are constrained to be equal for diversified and standalone firms; thus,
proper identification requires same model structures for both groups. In re-
ality, however, productivities of resources are expected to vary across these
firm types (Montgomery (1994)), resulting in differing model structures. In
this case, the ‘unexplained’ part of the valuation differential (∆OLSC ) is not
equivalent to the pure difference in group effects but also captures groups’
differences in slope coefficients. Basically, interacting diversification status
with the predictor variables (e.g. size, leverage) would allow for heteroge-
neous coefficients on X and in consequence help to retrieve the ‘true’ group
difference effect (Elder et al. (2010)).
1.3.2 The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
In contrast to conventional OLS analysis, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
(Oaxaca (1973), Blinder (1973)) allows us to explicitly break the excess value
differential into two components, an ‘endowment’ (‘explained’) and a ‘coeffi-
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cient’ (‘unexplained’) effect. Further, each factor’s contribution to these two
effects is estimated.
In a first step, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition estimates separate ex-
cess value functions for each firm type g, thereby allowing for different model
structures across diversified and standalone firms.3
Y OBig = αg +X
′
igβg + νig for g = {A ≡ standalone, B ≡ conglomerate} (4)
Analogous to the theoretical OLS decomposition above, differences in
firm valuation are analyzed by comparing conditional expectations of both
groups’ excess values (Fortin et al. (2010)):
∆OB0 = E[YBi|D = 1]− E[YAi|D = 0]. (5)
By LIE and conditional mean independence of the error term, E[νi|X,DB] =
0, we yield:
∆OB0 = E[E(YBi|X,D = 1)|D = 1]− E[E(YAi|X,D = 0)|D = 0]
= E[XBi|D = 1]βB − E[XAi|D = 0]βA. (6)
Adding and subtracting the mean excess value each firm type hypothet-
ically would achieve under a particular reference excess value structure β∗,
E[XAi|D = 0]β∗ for standalones and E[XBi|D = 1]β∗ for diversified firms,
and finally re-arranging terms leads to a generalized linear decomposition
expression first proposed by Oaxaca and Ransom (1994):
∆OB0 = E([XBi|D = 1]− [XAi|D = 0])β∗
+ {E[XBi|D = 1](βB − β∗) + E[XAi|D = 0](β∗ − βA)}
= ∆OBX +∆
OB
C (7)
Replacing expected values by the sample analogues, the OB decomposi-
3Overlapping support must hold though, i.e. the set of predictor variables is required
to be the same for both firm types.
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tion of the predicted valuation differential is estimated as follows:
∆ˆOB0 = (X¯Bi − X¯Ai)′βˆ∗︸ ︷︷ ︸+ {X¯ ′Bi(βˆB − βˆ∗) + X¯ ′Ai(βˆ∗ − βˆA)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
= ∆ˆOBX + ∆ˆ
OB
C (8)
The first term of the sample decomposition (∆ˆOBX ) constitutes the ag-
gregate ‘explained’ effect, subsuming distributional differences in all factors
that contribute to the excess value differential. In other words, the ‘ex-
plained’ effect expresses the hypothetical change in conglomerates’ mean ex-
cess value once they had the average endowment of standalones’ characteris-
tics weighted by the vector of reference coefficients βˆ∗. Second component of
the decomposition (∆ˆOBC ) is the aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect that captures
differences in the productivities of included factors and constants. It is com-
puted as the change in excess values if each firm type was evaluated according
to the reference excess value structure βˆ∗ – at its actual average factor lev-
els. This aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect is equivalent to the diversification
discount in conventional OLS estimation.4
Finally, and being the major advantage to conventional OLS analysis,
the two aggregate effects are further broken down into its subcomponents
(∆ˆOBXk and ∆ˆ
OB
Ck
) by an additive detailed decomposition. Thus, the contri-
bution of every single input factor Xk to each of both aggregate effects is
estimated, so that ∆ˆOBX = Σ
K
k=1∆ˆ
OB
Xk
and ∆ˆOBC = Σ
K
k=1∆ˆ
OB
Ck
. Splitting the
aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect into its subcomponents enables us to unveil
the single advantages and disadvantages of diversification that do not stem
from different group endowments.
Identification problems associated with the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition
There are also some limitations to the use of this method. One challenge
is to find the correct reference coefficient vector βˆ∗. The question about its
4The similarity of the aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect deduced from the Oaxaca-Blinder
decomposition and the coefficient of the diversification dummy δˆ in a pooled sample OLS
regression depends on the chosen reference excess value structure βˆ∗ and the correlation
between the diversification dummy D and the factors X (Bonnal et al. (2013)).
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determination is synonymous to the quest for an appropriate counterfactual
excess value model structure.5 For our analysis, we therefore use a weighted
average expression (e.g. Neumark (1988), Oaxaca and Ransom (1988)) that
permits us to assign alternative reference coefficients:
βˆ∗ = ΩβˆA + (I −Ω)βˆB (9)
with Ω denoting the coefficient weight and I an identity matrix. As de-
fault weighting scheme, we use the proportion s of standalone firms in the
overall sample (74%), thus Ω = sAI (Cotton (1988)). For robustness pur-
poses, we further apply an equal weighting scheme with Ω = (0.5)I (Reimers
(1983)). As a third alternative, we assume the slope coefficients and the con-
stant of standalone firms to constitute the appropriate reference excess value
structure, i.e. Ω = I reduces the reference coefficient vector to βˆ∗ = βA (Oax-
aca (1973)) and counterfactual outcomes of the diversified firms are based on
the coefficients of standalones. In this case, the OB decomposition reduces
to ∆ˆOB0 = (X¯Bi − X¯Ai)′βˆA + X¯ ′Bi(βˆB − βˆA).
Another identification problem relates to adding categorical variables to
the estimation equation (Jones (1983)). When following conventional prac-
tice by including dummy variables – in our case period and ownership-related
dummies – results depend on a more or less arbitrarily chosen and eventu-
ally omitted base category. This leads to a ‘mixed effect’-constant capturing
both the desired group effect and the base category effect of the categorical
variable. To obtain the undistorted effect of group g, we follow Yun (2005)
who proposes a coefficient transformation of the categorical variable, so that
ΣKk=1β˜g,k = 0. Using standard dummy coding, an unweighted average coef-
ficent c is computed, which is equivalent to the value of the base category
k = 1; thus c = ΣKk ̸=1βg,k/K with β˜g,k=1 = c. Finally, c is subtracted from
each of the other category dummy coefficients, β˜g,k ̸=1 = βg,k ̸=1 − c, to obtain
normalized coefficients.
Further, violation of the conditional mean independence assumption of
5Precise determination of the ‘true’ counterfactual model structure suffers from inherent
constraints of the underlying partial equilibrium model.
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the error term due to endogeneity and hence biased coefficient estimation,
is a commonly addressed issue in corporate finance studies. Other than the
primary field of application of the OB method which concerns the decompo-
sition of wage gaps between groups that are assigned exogenously by nature
(e.g. race or gender), allocation into a particular firm structure is supposingly
non-random. In our case, non-random selection into diversification status is
found to distort results on the effect of diversification (e.g. Campa and Kedia
(2002), Villalonga (2004)). In order to correct for potential bias, we apply
a two-step treatment effect model where an indicator variable for reporting
a nonzero amount of minority interest on firms’ balance sheet is used as ex-
cluded exogenous variable (see e.g. Dimitrov and Tice (2006), Kuppuswamy
and Villalonga (2010)). As ownership-related variables – which are key for
the identification of agency costs – are included in our regressions, potential
reverse causality between firm performance and ownership structure needs to
be accounted for (Demsetz and Lehn (1985)). For doing so, we follow Laeven
and Levine (2009) using the initial industry averages of respective ownership
variables as instruments for an instrumental variable (IV) estimation.
1.4 Sample selection and description
1.4.1 Sample selection and variables
The starting point of our analysis is the sample of all CDAX-listed firms
in Germany from 2000 to 2009. We retrieve business segment informa-
tion from Worldscope/Datastream and ownership data from Commerzbank’s
“Wer geho¨rt zu wem?” database.
Business segment data
To clean the raw data collected from Worldscope/Datastream, we proceed as
follows. We exclude firms with segments in the financial services sector (SIC
6000 - 6999) from the sample. We further remove firm-years with insufficient
financial information, including all observations with missing data on market
capitalization, total debt, minority interest, total sales, and segment sales. In
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a next step, faulty sales figures are eliminated; this includes all observations
with negative total sales or segment sales, total sales of zero, and where the
sum of segment sales is less than 99% or greater than 101% of total sales.
Given the database’s poor coverage on segment assets and earnings, we base
our analyses exclusively on sales.
Firm type is defined at the two-digit SIC code level, i.e. we focus on
unrelated diversification.6 Firms are classified as diversified if they report
sales in two or more segments, with the most important segment accounting
for less than 90% of total sales. Correspondingly, firms are classified as
standalone if they report sales in only one segment or if the most important
segment accounts for more than 90% of total sales.
We compute excess values for both diversified and standalone firms in
each year as the natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s actual value
to its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value corresponds to the sum of its
imputed segment values; a segment’s imputed value is calculated by multi-
plying its sales with the median firm value-to-sales ratio of all standalone
firms operating in the same two-digit SIC industry in a certain year. Aggre-
gated firm value-to-sales multipliers are derived using an extended dataset of
Continental European firms and consist of at least one standalone observa-
tion; we do so in order to allow for a sufficient number of benchmark firms.
Following prior studies of the diversification discount, observations with im-
puted values greater than four or less than one-fourth times the actual value
are excluded from the sample.7
Further, we derive the following control variables commonly used in con-
glomerate discount studies: firm size measured as logarithm of total assets,
leverage defined as book value of debt divided by total assets, EBIT to sales,
capital expenditures to sales, and cash and short-term investments to total
6Previous studies on the conglomerate discount distinguish between unrelated and re-
lated diversification; the former is defined based on a two-digit SIC code level, the latter is
derived on the basis of four-digit SIC codes. Berger and Ofek (1995) show that relatedness
strongly mitigates the value loss from diversification. In order to ensure a significantly
large valuation gap between the two firm groups, we thus choose to focus on conglomerates
whose business segments are not that closely correlated.
7Additional details on the calculation of the excess value measure are provided in the
appendix.
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assets.
Ownership data
In order to analyze the potential agency costs associated with diversification,
we hand-collected direct and ultimate layer ownership data from the “Wer
geho¨rt zu wem?” database published by Commerzbank.
In many countries, firms are controlled by one or two large shareholders;
they typically hold a substantial number of voting rights but only relatively
few cash flow rights (La Porta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000, 2002),
Faccio and Lang (2002)). Given this widely observed separation of control
and ownership, we focus our analysis on ultimate rather than direct owner-
ship. In order to determine a firm’s ultimate shareholder, we trace control
and ownership along the complete chain of corporate control. In line with
prior literature, we thereby distinguish between a control threshold of 10%
and 20%. Control rights of ownership (C) define a shareholder’s ability to
influence the way a firm is run and are measured by the weakest link in the
chain of voting rights. Cash flow rights of ownership (O) refer to the fraction
of the firm’s profits to which a shareholder is entitled and are derived as the
product of cash flow rights along the chain.
Identification of agency costs
We assess ownership concentration in terms of control rights rather than
cash flow rights. As discussed by Sautner and Villalonga (2010), ownership
concentration (in the following ‘concentration of control ownership’ ) can be a
mixed blessing: on the one hand, it can mitigate the agency conflict between
corporate managers and outside shareholders; on the other hand, it can stir
up the agency problem between majority and minority owners. As greater
control in the hands of the largest owner allows for a better monitoring of
the management, former agency problem is reduced. At the same time, the
latter is exacerbated as a higher level of control rights increases the largest
owner’s ability to extract private benefits at the expense of non-controlling
owners.
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Accordingly, an analysis of the relation between concentration of control
ownership and firms’ excess value will indicate which of both agency problems
– if any – actually dominates. Single OLS regressions for both conglomerate
and standalone subsamples will provide a first indication on whether agency
conflicts work heterogeneously across the two firm types. In general, if the
corporate manager - outside shareholder conflict prevails, concentration of
control ownership should have a positive impact on excess value; whereas, if
firms are more prone to the majority - minority conflict, control concentration
and excess value should be negatively related. We expect to observe no
significant impact of control concentration in case that both conflicts offset
each other.
In a second step, Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition allows for a more accu-
rate comparison of the effects of agency problems between both firm groups.
In case the corporate manager - outside shareholder conflict is more severe
in diversified than standalone firms (i.e. a given level of control concentra-
tion has a more positive effect for diversified firms), control concentration
will help to reduce the excess value gap. In contrast, if diversified firms
are more struck by the conflict between majority and minority shareholders
(i.e. a given level of control concentration has a more negative effect for di-
versified firms), control concentration will deteriorate the problem resulting
in an increase of the excess value differential. If diversified and standalone
firms are equally affected by a given level of control concentration, we reject
agency costs as a relevant cause for the valuation gap. Thus, concentration
of control ownership allows us to identify to which extent both firm groups
differ in their exposure to agency conflicts and how this eventually affects
the diversification discount.
The larger the discrepancy between cash flow and voting rights is, the
higher the risk of minority shareholder expropriation (Claessens et al. (2002)).
Thus, once concentration of control ownership identifies a prevailing major-
ity - minority shareholder conflict, we expect measures of the separation of
ownership and control to confirm this conflict. We compute three alterna-
tive variables capturing the difference between both, thereby accounting for
dual class shares and pyramid schemes. First, the control-ownership wedge
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(C−O) is the difference between the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow
ownership; it equals zero if control and cash flow concentration are alike
and is larger than zero if control exceeds cash flow ownership. The larger
the wedge is, the higher the risk of minority owner expropriation (see e.g.
Claessens et al. (2002)). Second, the control-ownership ratio (C/O) is the
quotient of the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow ownership; it assumes
the value of one if control equals cash flow ownership and is larger than one
if control exceeds cash flow ownership. The higher the ratio, the greater the
ultimate owner’s incentives to extract private benefits from the firm, harming
marginal shareholders. Third, the divergence dummy (Divergence) equals
one if control and cash flow ownership divert, and zero otherwise (see e.g.
Lin et al. (2011)).
Table 1 provides a summary of the variable definitions used in the de-
scriptive and empirical analyses.
Please insert Table 1 approximately here
Our final data set comprises 2,730 firm-year observations from 479 different
firms. Thereof, diversified firms account for 723 firm-years (26.5%), while
standalones account for the remaining 2,007 observations (73.5%). The fol-
lowing section provides descriptive statistics on the sample.
1.4.2 Sample description
Table 2 presents ownership characteristics of our sample firms at the direct
and ultimate ownership level and distinguishes between standalone and con-
glomerate observations.8
Please insert Table 2 approximately here
We record an extensive presence of blockholders across all firms. At the direct
level of ownership (5% threshold), only 5.0% of firm-years are classified as
widely-held. At the 10% ultimate ownership level, the number of widely-
held observations slightly increases to 10.0%. Thus, in line with previous
8Ultimate ownership data described in the text is based on the 10% control threshold;
results based on the 20% threshold show quite similar results.
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literature (e.g. Faccio and Lang (2002)), we find blockholder ownership to be
material in Germany. Further, dual class shares as a device for shareholders
to enhance their control are found for the minority of observations; only
6.6% of the sample firms issued shares that do not comply with the one vote-
one share principle. Pyramidal schemes, i.e. firm structures with at least
one intermediate owner in the chain of control, are observed for 14.8% of
all firm-years. Deep pyramid structures, however, appear to be rather rare
among German firms; only 4.4% have an ultimate owner with three or more
intermediate owners in the control chain. All in all, a divergence of voting and
cash flow rights (C ̸= O) – either due to dual class shares or pyramid schemes
– is recorded for 15.5% of all firm-year observations.9 Differentiating among
firm types, we note that dual class shares (6.9% versus 6.5%) and pyramiding
schemes (15.2% versus 14.6%) are slightly more prevalent in diversified than
standalone firms. Accordingly, the percentage of firms showing a divergence
in the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow ownership is higher among
conglomerates as well (16.2% versus 15.3%).
Table 3 outlines the development of German firms’ ownership character-
istics over time.10
Please insert Table 3 approximately here
Concentration of control ownership declined over time. At the direct level,
it decreased from 46.8% in 2000 to 42.0% in 2009; at the ultimate level (10%
control threshold), it dropped from 41.3% to 40.3%. Further, the divergence
of control and cash flow ownership declined as well. For instance, the wedge
between the two (C − O) fell from 3.71 percentage points in 2000 to 1.13
percentage points in 2009; alternative measures (C/O, Divergence dummy)
show the same development. In addition, we note a reduction in the number
of firms with pyramidal structures from 20.0% to 10.7%. These developments
9Attention needs to be drawn to the fact that the existence of pyramids does not neces-
sarily involve a divergence between the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow ownership;
in numerous cases the intermediate owner(s) are fully controlled (100%) by the ultimate
owner. This explains why divergence C ̸= O does not simply add up to 21.4%.
10Ultimate ownership data presented is again based on the 10% control threshold; results
based on the 20% threshold show similar results though.
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can in part be attributed to the corporate capital gains tax repeal, which was
made effective in 2002; this tax reform is argued to have contributed to the
dissolution of well-established complex ownership structures among German
large caps, typically referred to as the disappearance of the Germany Inc.
(see e.g. Weber (2009)).
Table 4 provides descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent
variables used in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, with special emphasis
on the mean differences between diversified and standalone firms.
Please insert Table 4 approximately here
Prerequisite for conducting an Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition is the existence
of significant group differences in the outcome variable. The mean excess
value is -0.169 and -0.223 for standalone and diversified firms, respectively;
the null hypothesis of equal excess values can be rejected at a 6% significance
level. With regard to general firm characteristics, we find diversified firms to
be significantly larger and to maintain a higher leverage ratio (23.2%) than
standalones (19.6%). Further, they hold significantly less cash (11.9% versus
14.1%) and maintain a lower investment ratio (5.1% versus 7.5%). These
findings are in line with prior studies on the diversification discount (e.g.
Kuppuswamy and Villalonga (2010)). In addition, ownership-related char-
acteristics reveal that for two of three divergence measures (C − O, C/O),
the separation of voting and cash flow rights is significantly higher in con-
glomerates. This points towards a higher risk of minority expropriation in
diversified firms. The existence and extent of pyramid schemes is similar
among both firm groups, though. We note that conglomerates’ greater ex-
posure to minority expropriation risk is inferred from their higher level of
divergence between control and ownership; this result is to be contrasted
from our later analysis where we examine whether the same level of diver-
gence shows different effects across both firm types.
1.5 Empirical analysis and discussion
In this section, we present and discuss the results of our empirical analysis.
First, we apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition on our base model: ulti-
18
mate ownership variables are based on a 10% control threshold; we employ a
reference coefficient weight of Ω = 0.74 (Cotton (1988)) reflecting the frac-
tion of standalone firms in the overall sample. Secondly, we perform various
robustness checks considering the stricter 20% control threshold, alterna-
tive reference coefficient weights as proposed by Oaxaca (1973) and Reimers
(1983), and different measures of the divergence between voting and cash flow
rights. Concerns associated with a potential endogeneity of the diversifica-
tion decision and reverse causality between ownership and firm performance
are addressed, too.
1.5.1 Basic results
Table 5 depicts results from separate OLS regressions for standalone and di-
versified firms as well as the corresponding Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.11
Firms’ excess value is used as dependent variable. Along with the control
variables introduced in Section 4.1.1, we include concentration of control
ownership (C) and the control-ownership wedge (C −O) into the regression
equation in order to identify firms’ exposure to agency conflicts.
Please insert Table 5 approximately here
Single OLS regressions
Results of firm types’ single OLS regressions already point to differing model
structures. Firm size is reported to exert a significant positive effect on
excess value for standalone firms, while it is a negative predictor for con-
glomerates’ excess value. Even though EBIT to sales, CAPEX to sales, cash
to total assets and leverage are found to positively predict excess value for
both firm types, the magnitude of effects is stronger for diversified firms.
Further, concentration of control ownership (C) and the control-ownership
wedge (C −O) suggest agency conflicts to work heterogeneously across firm
types. We document significant negative coefficients for diversified firms, in-
dicating a predominance of the majority - minority shareholder conflict. This
11We apply the Stata routine oaxaca implemented by Jann (2008).
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is in accordance with the findings of Claessens (1999). For standalone firms,
in contrast, concentration of control ownership (C) is insignificant, whereas
the control-ownership wedge (C −O) shows a significant positive coefficient.
This positive effect of a separation of ownership and control on standalones’
excess value is in line with Bauguess et al. (2012). They argue that the
unbundling of cash flow and voting rights enables dominant shareholders
to sell substantial economic ownership and diversify their wealth while re-
taining control. This leads to a closer alignment of interest with minority
shareholders and is associated with an increase in corporate focus.
Aggregate Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Predicted mean excess values are -0.171 for standalones and -0.230 for di-
versified firms, resulting in a mean difference of 0.060 in favor of standalone
firms, significant at the 5% level.12 Decomposition at the aggregate level
shows that 19.7% (0.012) of the excess value differential is attributable to
endowment differences (aggregate ‘explained’ effect), whereas the major part
of the valuation gap (80.3%) is caused by differences in the productivities of
factors (aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect). Latter effect (0.048) is in line with
Lins and Servaes (1999) who find a negative but insignificant diversification
discount for Germany.
Detailed Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition
Detailed decomposition analysis breaks both aggregate effects into their indi-
vidual components, thus assigns the contribution of each predictor variable to
respective effects. Share shows the percentage contribution of each variable’s
‘endowment’ and ‘coefficient’ effect to the predicted excess value differential,
and illustrates how these single effects on the value gap partly offset each
other.
We begin with the detailed decomposition of the ‘explained’ effect. Each
factor’s coefficient expresses how the predicted excess value of diversified
12We apply heteroscedastic-robust standard errors for demonstration purposes. Using
cluster-robust standard errors turns the predicted excess value differential insignificant;
however, all other results remain stable (tables are available on request.)
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firms would change once they adopted the mean endowment level of stan-
dalones. A positive coefficient reveals that standalones’ average endowment
has a comparably more beneficial effect on the excess value, i.e. contributes
to an increasing excess value gap. Other way around, a negative coefficient
indicates a more favorable average endowment of diversified firms resulting
in a reduction of the gap. Standalones’ higher endowment of cash holdings –
as already indicated by the univariate analysis in Table 4 – significantly con-
tributes to the excess value differential. Thus, adopting the average cash level
of standalones would cause diversified firms to increase their excess value by
0.026, translating into a narrowing of the value gap by 43.8%. This finding
is supported by previous literature; for example, Duchin (2010) shows that,
given the presence of an active internal capital market, conglomerates hold
significantly less cash than standalones. The higher CAPEX endowment of
the latter also strongly contributes to the ‘explainable’ part of the excess
value gap (0.023, 37.6%). In contrast, conglomerates benefit significantly
from their higher leverage level, leading to a 0.015 (24.5%) decrease in the
predicted excess value differential. This result can be explained by the coin-
surance feature of diversified firms (i.e. the imperfect correlation among the
cash flows of a conglomerate’s different business lines reduces default risk),
giving them a greater debt capacity and, thus, relative tax advantage (Berger
and Ofek (1995)). From a diversified firm’s point of view, the two disadvan-
tageous effects stemming from standalones’ higher endowment of CAPEX
and cash (0.049, 81.4%) are, in part, balanced by conglomerates’ own higher
endowment of debt (-0.015, -24.5%). Other than the univariate analysis sug-
gests, neither of the differences in ownership characteristics across firm types
significantly impacts the endowment-based valuation gap. Summing up the
individual contributions of each single factor, including all predictor variables
and year dummies, results in the aggregate ‘explained’ effect of 0.012.
We now turn to the detailed decomposition of the ‘unexplained’ compo-
nent of the excess value gap, i.e. our measure of the diversification discount.
It allows for answering the question which factor productivity difference sig-
nificantly contributes to the widening or narrowing of the excess value gap,
and is computed as the change in excess values if each firm type was evaluated
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according to the reference excess value structure βˆ∗ – at its actual average
endowment levels. As stated above, we employ a reference coefficient weight
of Ω = 0.74 (Cotton (1988)). A positive coefficient reveals that the same
endowment level across standalones and conglomerates has a more negative
effect on the latter, i.e. contributes to an increasing excess value gap. On
the contrary, a negative coefficient indicates that a given endowment level
has a more favorable effect on diversified firms, thus reduces the excess value
differential.
Although the aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect is not found to be statis-
tically significant, detailed decomposition proves single factor productivity
differences to be so. In line with the single OLS regressions, concentration
of control ownership (C) and the control-ownership wedge (C − O) prove
agency conflicts to work heterogeneously across diversified and standalone
firms. The positive coefficient of concentration of control ownership (0.061,
102.5%) – though insignificant – indicates that a given level of control concen-
tration has a more negative effect for diversified firms, thus, points towards
a dominance of the majority - minority shareholder conflict in diversified
firms. With respect to our measure of the separation of ownership and con-
trol, we find highly significant evidence that the same degree of divergence
of ultimate owners’ cash flow and voting rights among standalone and diver-
sified firms has a more negative effect on the latter (0.022, 37.2%). Hence,
we conclude the majority - minority shareholder conflict to be the stronger
force on the diversification discount, whereby its impact is more pronounced
given a discrepancy between majority owners’ voting and cash flow rights.
We explain this finding by the higher complexity of conglomerates. Their
cross-industry activities and myriad of intra-firm transactions make it more
difficult for marginal investors to unveil opportunistic behavior, such as tun-
neling; incentives to extract private beneftis therefore are higher among con-
glomerates’ controlling shareholders (Dewenter et al. (2001)). The observed
dominance of agency costs in diversified firms is expected to be also re-
flected in differences among other factors’ productivities. Accordingly, we
observe firm size to have a considerably more negative effect for diversified
firms (0.644, 1075.3%) – a finding strongly adding to our argument that
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the higher agency costs in conglomerates can be attributed to their greater
complexity. Advantages of diversification can be deduced from the beneficial
effect of cash holdings and CAPEX. The higher productivity of cash (-0.120,
-200.2%) and CAPEX (-0.064, -106.4%) may be directed to a more prof-
itable employment of these factors in diversified firms which is in accordance
with corresponding disadvantageous average endowments (0.026; 0.022). In
other words, marginal utility at actual endowment is higher than for average
levels in standalone firms. This feeds in the argument that a higher aver-
age endowment of cash and CAPEX would be value-enhancing in diversified
firms. Again, adding up the individual contributions of each single factor,
including all predictor variables and year dummies, constitutes the aggregate
‘unexplained’ effect of 0.048.
1.5.2 Robustness tests
Tables 6 to 9 provide further analyses, testing for the robustness of our
results.
Please insert Tables 6 - 9 approximately here
First, we repeat our base analysis applying the stricter 20% control thresh-
old in Table 6. We find our prior results confirmed. In Table 7, different
estimates of the ‘explained’ and ‘unexplained’ shares of the total value dif-
ferential are obtained using alternative coefficient weights. As the weight
increases from Ω = 0.5 (Reimers (1983)) to Ω = 1 (Oaxaca (1973)), a higher
proportion of the predicted excess value differential is explained by the ag-
gregate ‘explained’ effect, rising from 15.1% to 24.3%. However, regardless of
the weighting scheme, major results remain unchanged. Further decomposi-
tion results based on alternative control-ownership divergence measures are
presented in Table 8. The control-ownership ratio (C/O) and Divergence
dummy re-confirm results: Control-ownership divergence along with firm size
exert a relatively unfavorable impact on the excess value, i.e. contribute to a
widening of the excess value differential. CAPEX and cash holdings, in con-
trast, are associated with a diversification advantage. Endogeneity concerns
are addressed in Table 9. Model 1 shows the results of a two-step treatment
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effect model. The estimated lambda is positive but insignificant, indicating
the absence of firms’ self-selection into diversification. Accounting for reverse
causality between firm performance and ownership, we further perform an IV
estimation using industry averages as instruments in model 2. Out of a pre-
dicted excess value differential of 0.060, aggregate ‘unexplained’ effect is now
reported to be significant at a 10% level, reflecting a diversification discount
of 0.055 (91.9%). Agency cost identifier (C − O) and factor productivity
discounts (firm size) are still in line.
1.6 Conclusion
This paper makes several contributions. First, it introduces the Oaxaca-
Blinder decomposition as a novel approach to corporate finance research. The
technique is originally applied to describe discrimination in wages, dividing
the wage gap between two groups into an ‘explained’ part due to differences
in the endowment of characteristics (e.g. the higher the education level,
the higher the salary) and an ‘unexplained’ component due to differences in
the effects of characteristics (e.g. men and women, despite having the same
level of education, are rewarded differently). We consider the OB method to
be a likewise insightful approach for corporate finance topics, allowing for an
in-depth analysis of factors causing valuation differences between two distinc-
tive firm groups. In contrast to conventional OLS regression, it accounts for
between-group differences in the effects of variables. We exemplarily apply
the technique to study the mechanisms driving the value differential between
diversified and standalone firms, the so-called excess value gap. We thus
divide the gap into its ‘explained’ (endowment-based) part and its ‘unex-
plained’ (effect-based) part; the latter is our equivalent to the diversification
discount. Ultimately, we are able to quantify the contribution of every single
factor to each of both parts. Thus, OB decomposition allows us to examine
value differences between firm groups from a whole new perspective.
Second, we contribute to the academic debate about the value of corpo-
rate diversification. We apply the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to study
which of the two agency conflicts – the one between the management and out-
24
side shareholders or the other between majority and minority shareholders –
is the primary driver behind the excess value differential not attributable to
observable differences in the endowment of firm characteristics. Conglomer-
ates’ inefficient capital allocation is viewed as a major cause of the discount.
A substantial number of studies finds agency theory to lie at the heart of
the problem, with most of them focussing on the relevance of the corporate
manager - shareholder conflict. We are not able to support this view. In-
stead, we find the majority shareholder - minority shareholder conflict to
be a much more important driver of the discount. We explain this result
by conglomerates’ cross-industry activities and myriad of intra-firm transac-
tions, which make it more difficult for small investors to unveil opportunistic
actions, thus increasing ultimate owners’ incentives to extract private bene-
fits (Dewenter et al. (2001)). In addition, we document the same firm size
to have a considerably more adverse effect on diversified firms. This finding
strongly adds to our argument that lack of transparency caused by conglom-
erates’ high complexity leads to an adverse behavior of majority shareholders
and, thus, an inefficient allocation of internal resources. Our research has im-
portant practical implications regarding the measures diversified firms need
to implement in order to reduce the discount, as counteracting the majority -
minority shareholder conflict requires a different set of actions than the CEO
- shareholder conflict.
Our analyses and findings are based on a sample of CDAX firms from
2000 to 2009. Previous German evidence on diversified firms is scarce and
mixed: Lins and Servaes (1999) do not find a significant discount on German
conglomerates; Glaser and Mu¨ller (2010), however, report the opposite. The
study at hand documents a predicted mean excess value difference between
diversified and standalone firms of -0.060, significant at the 5% level. How-
ever, the ‘unexplained’ part of the gap is insignificant for the majority of
model specifications. Given the contradictory views of previous studies and
the limited significance of our own results, Germany may not be an ideal
setting to investigate the phenomenon of the diversification discount. How-
ever, an in-depth analysis of the agency costs associated with diversification
requires access to ultimate ownership data, which we only have had avail-
25
able for German firms. Moreover, the primary purpose of this paper is to
introduce the OB decomposition as a new econometrical device to corporate
finance research; the data set at hand is sufficient for these demonstration
purposes.
26
1.7 Tables
Table 1: Variable definitions
The table exhibits the variable definitions used in the descriptive and empirical analyses.
Variable Definition
Firm type Firms are classified as diversified if they report sales in two or more two-digit SIC
code segments, with the most important segment accounting for less than 90% of
total sales; otherwise, firms are defined as standalone.
Excess value Natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s actual value to its imputed value. A
firm’s imputed value is the sum of its imputed segment values; a segment’s imputed
value is derived by multiplying its sales with the median firm value-to-sales ratio of
all standalone firms operating in the same two-digit SIC industry in a certain year.
Observations with imputed values greater than four or less than one-fourth times the
actual value are excluded. (See e.g. Berger and Ofek (1995))
Firm size Logarithm of total assets
EBIT / sales Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total sales
CAPEX / sales Capital expenditures divided by total sales
Cash / assets Cash and short-term investments divided by total assets
Leverage Book value of debt divided by total assets
Widely-held firm The largest direct or ultimate shareholder has control ownership below the threshold
(5% for direct ownership, 10% and 20% for ultimate ownership). With regard to
direct ownership, we assume control and cash flow ownership to be the same, i.e.
dual class shares are not considered.
Blockholder-dominated firm The largest direct or ultimate shareholder has control ownership above the threshold
(5% for direct ownership, 10% and 20% for ultimate ownership). With regard to
direct ownership, we assume control and cash flow ownership to be the same, i.e.
dual class shares are not considered.
Control (C) Control rights of ownership refer to the voting rights of the largest shareholder at the
ultimate ownership level, measured by the weakest link in the chain of voting rights.
We distinguish between a 10% and 20% control threshold. We account for dual class
shares and pyramidal schemes. The variable is coded zero if control ownership falls
below the respective control threshold. (See e.g. Faccio and Lang (2002))
Ownership (O) Cash flow rights of ownership refer to the cash flow rights of the largest shareholder
at the ultimate ownership level, measured as the product of cash flow rights along
the chain. We distinguish between a 10% and 20% control threshold. We account
for dual class shares and pyramidal schemes.The variable is coded zero if control
ownership falls below the respective control threshold. (See e.g. Faccio and Lang
(2002))
Control - Ownership (C - O) Difference between the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow ownership. Variable is
zero if control equals cash flow ownership, and is larger than zero if control exceeds
cash flow ownership. (See e.g. Claessens et al. (2002))
Control/Ownership (C/O) Quotient of the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow ownership. Variable is one
if control equals cash flow ownership, and is larger than one if control exceeds cash
flow ownership. (See e.g. Lin et al. (2011))
Divergence dummy Dummy assuming one if control and cash flow ownership of the largest ultimate
owner divert, and zero otherwise.
Pyramid dummy Dummy assuming one if a pyramid scheme exists, i.e. if the largest ultimate owner
does not coincide with the largest direct owner, and zero otherwise. (See e.g. Palig-
orova and Xu (2012))
Pyramid layers Variable capturing the extent of pyramiding. It is zero for widely-held firms, one in
case of first-layer blockholdership, and two or more in case of multiple-layer block-
holdership. The firm possesses two or more layers if the largest ultimate owner does
not coincide with the largest direct owner. The extent of pyramiding does not au-
tomatically imply a divergence between the ultimate owner’s control and cash flow
ownership, e.g. the intermediate owner(s) may be fully controlled (100%) by the
ultimate owner.
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Table 2: Ownership characteristics of German firms
The table presents ownership characteristics of standalone and diversified firms at the
direct and ultimate ownership level. On the ultimate ownership level, we distinguish
between a control threshold of 10% and 20%. For variable definitions, please refer to
Table 1.
All firms Standalone Diversified
Obs. in % Obs. in % Obs. in %
Final sample 2,730 100.0 2,007 73.5 723 26.5
Direct ownership
Widely-held (< 5%) 137 5.0 101 5.0 36 5.0
Blockholder (≥ 5%) 2,593 95.0 1,906 95.0 687 95.0
Dual class shares 181 6.6 131 6.5 50 6.9
Ultimate ownership (10%)
(1) Widely-held (< 10%) 272 10.0 190 9.5 82 11.3
(2) Blockholder (≥ 10%) 2,458 90.0 1,817 90.5 641 88.7
—–(2a) First layer 2,055 75.3 1,524 75.9 531 73.4
—–(2b) Second layer 283 10.4 204 10.2 79 10.9
—–(2c) Third layer 83 3.0 65 3.2 18 2.5
—–(2d) Four or more layers 37 1.4 24 1.2 13 1.8
(3) Widely-held/First layer (1+2a) 2,327 85.2 1,714 85.4 613 84.8
(4) Pyramid layers > 1 (2b+2c+2d) 403 14.8 293 14.6 110 15.2
(5) Divergence C ̸= O 424 15.5 307 15.3 117 16.2
Ultimate ownership (20%)
(1) Widely-held (< 20%) 618 22.6 469 23.4 149 20.6
(2) Blockholder (≥ 20%) 2,112 77.4 1,538 76.6 574 79.4
—–(2a) First layer 1,769 64.8 1,292 64.4 477 66.0
—–(2b) Second layer 256 9.4 187 9.3 69 9.5
—–(2c) Third layer 63 2.3 47 2.3 16 2.2
—–(2d) Four or more layers 24 0.9 12 0.6 12 1.7
(3) Widely-held/First layer (1+2a) 2,387 87.4 1,761 87.7 626 86.6
(4) Pyramid layers > 1 (2b+2c+2d) 343 12.6 246 12.3 97 13.4
(5) Divergence C ̸= O 359 13.2 254 12.7 105 14.5
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis
The table provides descriptive statistics on dependent and independent variables used
in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. For variable definitions, please refer to Table 1.
Significance levels of mean differences: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10.
All firms Standalone (1) Diversified (2) Diff.
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD (1)-(2)
Dependent variable
Excess value -0.183 0.599 -0.169 0.596 -0.223 0.607 0.053 *
Control Variables
Firm size 12.201 2.013 12.159 2.056 12.317 1.885 -0.158 *
EBIT / sales -0.153 5.528 -0.221 6.447 0.036 0.163 -0.258
CAPEX / sales 0.069 0.135 0.075 0.151 0.051 0.076 0.024 ***
Cash / assets 0.135 0.158 0.141 0.162 0.119 0.145 0.022 ***
Leverage 0.206 0.189 0.196 0.189 0.232 0.186 -0.036 ***
Direct ownership
Blockholder (≥ 5%) 45.5% 28.7% 46.5% 29.2% 42.6% 26.9% 4.0% ***
Ultimate ownership (10%)
Control (C) 43.0% 28.5% 44.1% 29.1% 39.9% 26.5% 4.2% ***
Ownership (O) 40.6% 28.6% 41.8% 29.2% 37.1% 26.3% 4.8% ***
C - O 2.392 7.557 2.237 7.361 2.824 8.066 -0.588 *
C/O 1.369 4.623 1.275 2.174 1.629 8.223 -0.354 *
Divergence dummy 0.146 0.353 0.153 0.360 0.162 0.369 -0.009
Pyramid dummy 0.148 0.355 0.146 0.353 0.152 0.359 -0.006
Pyramid layers 1.112 0.704 1.114 0.686 1.107 0.751 0.007
Ultimate ownership (20%)
Control (C) 41.9% 30.7% 43.0% 31.5% 39.0% 28.1% 3.9% ***
Ownership (O) 39.7% 30.5% 40.9% 31.3% 36.3% 27.6% 4.6% ***
C - O 2.240 0.755 2.060 7.317 2.740 8.142 -0.679 **
C/O 1.229 3.960 1.145 1.196 1.460 7.433 -0.315 *
Divergence dummy 0.123 0.329 0.104 0.305 0.104 0.305 -0.019
Pyramid dummy 0.126 0.332 0.123 0.328 0.134 0.341 -0.012
Pyramid layers 0.943 0.721 0.927 0.704 0.986 0.764 -0.059 *
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Table 8: Robustness tests (III): Alternative divergence measures
The table shows Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition regressions with excess value as dependent
variable. We employ a coefficient weight of Ω = 0.74 (Cotton (1988)). We include concen-
tration of control ownership (C) plus the ratio between control and cash flow ownership
(C/O) in model 1 and a divergence dummy in model 2 as ultimate ownership variables;
a 10% control threshold is applied. For detailed variable definitions, please refer to Table
1. We apply heteroscedastic-robust standard errors. Significance is indicated at 1% (***),
5% (**), and 10% (*) levels.
C/O Divergence dummy
Coefficient SE Share Coefficient SE Share
Mean prediction - Standalone -0.170 0.014 -0.171 0.014
Mean prediction - Diversified -0.230 0.024 -0.230 0.024
Mean difference 0.060 ** 0.028 0.060 ** 0.028
Aggr. endowment effect 0.014 0.017 22.8% 0.013 0.016 21.4%
Aggr. coefficient effect 0.046 0.030 77.2% 0.047 0.030 78.6%
Endowment effect Endowment effect
Firm size -0.003 0.002 -4.8% -0.003 0.002 -5.1%
EBIT / sales -0.017 0.014 -27.7% -0.016 0.013 -27.0%
CAPEX / sales 0.022 *** 0.007 37.4% 0.022 *** 0.007 37.0%
Cash / assets 0.026 *** 0.009 43.3% 0.026 *** 0.009 43.3%
Leverage -0.014 *** 0.004 -23.7% -0.014 *** 0.004 -24.0%
C (10%) -0.001 0.002 -1.7% -0.002 0.002 -2.5%
C/O (10%) 0.000 0.000 0.1%
Divergence = 0 0.000 0.000 0.0%
Divergence = 1 0.000 0.000 0.0%
Year effects - Sum 0.000 0.0% 0.000 -0.2%
Coefficient effect Coefficient effect
Firm size 0.670 *** 0.169 1117.9% 0.612 *** 0.169 1022.5%
EBIT / sales -0.006 0.011 -9.2% -0.006 0.011 -10.4%
CAPEX / sales -0.065 * 0.035 -108.0% -0.067 * 0.036 -111.4%
Cash / assets -0.120 *** 0.027 -199.5% -0.118 *** 0.027 -197.1%
Leverage -0.008 0.037 -12.8% -0.005 0.037 -8.2%
C (10%) 0.044 0.039 74.2% 0.060 0.038 100.2%
C/O (10%) 0.072 ** 0.034 120.7%
Divergence = 0 -0.083 *** 0.030 -138.3%
Divergence = 1 0.015 *** 0.006 25.4%
Year effects - Sum 0.000 -0.4% -0.001 -0.9%
Constant -0.543 *** 0.209 -905.8% -0.361 * 0.214 -603.3%
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Table 9: Robustness tests (IV): Endogeneity concerns
The table shows Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition regressions with excess value as depen-
dent variable. We employ a coefficient weight of Ω = 0.74 (Cotton (1988)). We include
concentration of control ownership (C) and the wedge between control and cash flow own-
ership (C - O) as ultimate ownership variables, applying a 10% control threshold. Model
1 shows the results of a two-step treatment effect estimation, model 2 presents the results
of an IV estimation. For detailed variable definitions, please refer to Table 1. We apply
heteroscedastic-robust standard errors. Significance is indicated at 1% (***), 5% (**), and
10% (*) levels.
Treatment effect model IV estimation
Coefficient SE Share Coefficient SE Share
Mean prediction - Standalone -0.171 0.014 -0.171 0.015
Mean prediction - Diversified -0.312 0.064 -0.230 0.024
Mean difference 0.142 ** 0.066 0.060 ** 0.028
Aggr. endowment effect 0.007 0.015 4.9% 0.013 0.023 8.1%
Aggr. coefficient effect 0.135 * 0.069 95.1% 0.055 * 0.030 91.9%
Endowment effect Endowment effect
Firm size -0.003 0.002 -2.4% -0.002 0.002 -4.1%
EBIT / sales -0.018 0.012 -12.6% -0.016 0.011 -26.4%
CAPEX / sales 0.022 *** 0.005 15.5% 0.023 *** 0.005 39.1%
Cash / assets 0.027 *** 0.009 19.0% 0.027 *** 0.009 45.3%
Leverage -0.017 *** 0.005 -12.2% -0.016 *** 0.005 -27.3%
C (10%) -0.001 0.002 -1.0% 0.002 0.008 2.6%
C - O (10%) -0.002 0.002 -1.4% -0.012 0.009 -20.2%
Year effects - Sum 0.000 -0.1% -0.001 -0.9%
Coefficient effect Coefficient effect
Firm size 0.497 ** 0.208 350.6% 0.545 *** 0.177 909.6%
EBIT / sales -0.007 0.011 -4.9% -0.006 0.010 -10.1%
CAPEX / sales -0.061 *** 0.022 -42.8% -0.063 *** 0.022 -104.9%
Cash / assets -0.141 *** 0.032 -99.5% -0.116 *** 0.028 -193.0%
Leverage -0.075 0.062 -53.0% -0.002 0.040 -4.0%
C (10%) 0.074 * 0.040 52.3% 0.016 0.090 27.5%
C - O (10%) 0.018 ** 0.008 12.8% 0.052 * 0.031 86.9%
Year effects - Sum 0.000 -0.1% 0.000 0.8%
Constant -0.170 0.310 -120.3% -0.372 0.244 -620.9%
Lambda 0.720 0.538
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1.9 Appendix
The excess value model pioneered by Berger and Ofek (1995) compares a
firm’s actual value against the value of a matched portfolio of standalone
firms, the so-called imputed value. The authors start by forming peer groups
of standalones in different industries; industry classification is based on SIC
codes. By relating firm values to different accounting items (such as sales),
multipliers for every standalone firm j in period t are calculated (1).
M
FV/Sales
j,t =
FVj,t
Salesj,t
(1)
Based on these individual multipliers, median aggregated firm value-to-sales
multipliers of all standalone firms j = 1, ..., J operating in the same industry
k in a certain period t are built (2).
IndM(Median)
FV/Sales
k,t = inf
(
M
FV/Sales
j,t
F (M
FV/Sales
j,t )
≥ 1
2
)
(2)
For each segment k = 1, ..., n of firm i (diversified or standalone firm) in
period t, an imputed value is calculated by multiplying the segment’s ac-
counting item with the respective industry multiplier. The imputed value of
firm i is the sum of the imputed values of the firm’s segments (3).
IFVi,t =
n∑
k=1
Salesk,t × IndMFV/Salesk,t (3)
Berger and Ofek (1995) finally calculate excess values as the natural loga-
rithm of the ratio of a firm’s actual value to its imputed value (4).
EFVi,t = ln
FVi,t
IFVi,t
(4)
A positive conglomerate excess value indicates that the value of the diversified
firm is higher than that of the benchmark portfolio of standalones. A negative
excess value indicates the opposite.
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2.1 Introduction
To create a more business friendly environment for investment with greater
shareholder focus, the 2000 Tax Reduction Act exempted corporate investors
from taxation on profits arising from the disposal of long-term equity holdings
in German corporations. As the taxation on capital gains was argued to act
as a trading barrier, the tax reform aimed to encourage corporate investors
to divest their block holdings on a large scale. This in turn was expected
to dissolve the traditional structures of concentrated ownership and cross-
holdings in Germany – all this to the benefit of the marginal shareholders.
In order to evaluate the true impact of the Tax Reduction Act on own-
ership concentration and firm value, we exploit the differing exposure of
controlling owners to the tax reform. In particular, we contrast CDAX firms
held by tax exempted corporate investors with comparable firms controlled by
individual blockholders. Surprisingly, our difference-in-differences estimates
suggest an increase in ownership concentration in those firms with controlling
owners most exposed to tax reductions. We attribute this exogenous shift in
share structure to the joint work of the reform’s tax barrier reductions and
the existence of heterogeneous value premia attached to the invested firms.
Alongside with increased ownership concentration, the tax reform is para-
doxically found to have exerted a positive impact on firm value. Using again
the exogenous variation in control concentration induced by the tax reform,
our instrumental variable (IV) estimates are in support of a positive causal
effect of ownership concentration on firm value. Following our theoretical
model on the trade-off relation between agency costs caused by both man-
agement entrenchment and minority expropriation, we suggest the positive
value effect of higher ownership concentration to derive from strengthened
management monitoring by the controlling owner.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the changes of the
corporate and income tax law within the 2000 Tax Reduction Act. Section
3 introduces our underlying theoretical framework. Our data and the de-
velopment of ownership concentration and corresponding firm values around
the tax reform are presented in section 4. Section 5 outlines our estimation
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framework and discusses the results. Part 6 concludes.
2.2 The Tax Reduction Act of 2000
In an attempt to bolster the international competitiveness of the German
economy, the Tax Reduction Act (Steuersenkungsgesetz ) aimed to reduce
the corporate and individual tax burden while shifting from an imputation
taxation system of taxing profits arising from shareholdings in German cor-
porations – including dividends and capital gains – to a taxation system
similar to the U.S.1 The prior imputation system was criticized to disad-
vantage foreign investors compared to German investors; however, the new
taxation system brought along the problem of double taxation of profits at
the corporation as well as the shareholder level. In order to counter the effects
of double taxation, tax exemptions on the shareholder level were pursued,
though differing substantially for corporate and individual shareholders.
First, the change in the Corporation Tax Act (§ 8b (2) KStG) fully abol-
ished corporate taxation of profits from the disposal of long-term equity
stakes held in German corporations.2 Against the background of prevailing
concentrated ownership by financial and non-financial corporate investors as
well as exclusive cross-holdings maintained by financial institutions in the
late 1990s, the German capital market was argued to restrict viable cor-
porate control, investment opportunities for outsiders and hence potential
takeovers (Hoepner, 2003). The prior high corporate capital gains taxation
of around 50% arguably exerted a lock-in effect preventing efficiency driving
acquisitions and divestitures and eventually caused high deadweight costs
(Edwards et al., 2004). Therefore, the change in the corporate tax law was
expected to encourage corporate investors to sell their equity holdings to a
considerable extent while creating a more dispersed ownership structure in
Germany that converges to the Anglo-American system (Lane, 2004) with
1For a comprehensive summary on the tax reform see Edwards et al. (2004).
2Recent studies that use the corporate tax reform for causal inference are e.g. Sautner
and Villalonga (2010) who study the relationship between ownership concentration and
capital market efficiency; and von Beschwitz (2012) who analyzes the impact of exogenous
cash windfalls on acquisition decisions.
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some even predicting the disappearance of the traditional structures of the
so-called Germany, Inc. (Steinborn, 2001; Keen, 2002; Andres et al., 2011).
With respect to individual blockholders, the reform of the Income Tax Act
(§ 3(40) EStG) reduced capital gains taxation to a minor extent. However,
the so-called half-income method mainly favored blockholding individuals
with an equity stake larger than 10% and a personal tax rate higher than
40% (Jacobs et al., 2000)3 – criteria assumed to be met by the controlling
shareholders under investigation. In short, the tax law changes under the
Tax Reduction Act gave corporate shareholders a far greater tax advantage
relative to individual shareholders. First announced in December 1999, the
tax reform was passed in July 2000 after intensive discussions (Hoepner,
2000) and came into effect on January 1, 2002.
2.3 Theoretical Framework
In this section we introduce a simple theoretical framework in order to exam-
ine both the response behavior of different shareholder groups – in particular
corporate and individual investors – to the incentives provided by the Tax
Reduction Act, and the corresponding indirect effect on the ownership con-
centration and the firm value of the controlled CDAX firm, hereafter also
referred to as investee firm. As a short preview of the following model, we
assume that the controlling owner first tries to optimize her equity position
while facing the tax incentives for a share disposal and the degree of in-
dustry affiliation with the investee. Once the equity stake in the investee is
adjusted, she accordingly changes both the extent of management monitoring
effort and the extraction of private benefits.
2.3.1 Investor View
Prior to the tax reform, capital gains in the course of the disposal of shares
were subject to the taxation rate τg varying across the shareholder tax groups
3In contrast, individuals with a stake of between 1% and 10% and/or a personal tax
rate of less than 40% were exposed to an even higher taxation of capital gains (Breithecker
et al., 2001).
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g. In this event, the vendor received the book value of his investment V B
plus potential capital gains – as the difference between the market value V M
and the book value V B – reduced by the corresponding pre-reform tax rate
τg, i.e. V
B + [1 − τg](V M − V B). The high taxation rate was argued to
act as trading barrier that prevented investors from selling their holdings
and hence realizing capital gains. Consequently, market effectiveness and
efficiency was strongly impeded. As an additional factor that needs to be
taken into consideration when making divestiture decisions, Edwards et al.
(2004) suggest shareholders to assign a subjective value premium V S to their
invested firm that is mainly driven by a possible strategic industry affiliation
with the investee that allows for influential representation on the investee’s
supervisory board via a large block of control rights. This in turn provides
access to valuable private know-how and information (Goergen et al., 2004).
The magnitude of the strategic gain is assumed to differ mainly along the
closeness of the industry affiliation between the investor and the investee firm
(Lins and Servaes, 1999). This implies that the strategic premium substan-
tially differs with respect to the owner type, whether – in descending order
– the controlling investor is an industrial firm operating in the same or a
more remote industry as the investee, whether the blockholder is a financial
institution or a family. It is crucial to consider this differentiation as it helps
to understand the range of possible responses of the different tax owner types
to the tax reform’s incentives.
In general, the investor is suggested to keep her equity block in the in-
vestee as long as the subjective value premium4 is higher than the capital
gains after taxes:
V S > [1− τg](V M − V B). (1)
In words, the presence of high capital gains taxes rg made a disposal
of shares rather unlikely when considering some (individuals) or even strong
strategic interest (industrial firms) of investors in their investees. This further
4The strategic value premium V S can be expressed as the difference between the reser-
vation price the investor would at least demand for a disposal and the book value of the
investee firm
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implies that differences in the magnitude of the strategic premium across
owner types played no significant role when taxes were high for all investor
types.
Corporate Shareholders
With the complete removal of the trade barrier for corporate shareholders
([τT ](V
M − V B)) – as it came to happen with the repeal of capital gains
taxation within the Tax Reduction Act – the strategic value had to be of
great extent to still be willing to keep the equity block in the investee firm:
V S > (V M − V B). (2)
This condition is unlikely to be the case for corporate shareholders that
have rather little strategic interest in the investee, as this might be the case
for financial institutions or non-financial firms with insignificant industrial
affiliations. In fact, recent studies find evidence for the disposal of large
equity blocks in the wake of the Tax Reduction Act for financial investors
(e.g. Weber, 2009 and Andres et al., 2011). Edwards et al. (2004) ar-
gue that banks and insurances had acquired a large number of non-strategic
holdings after the second world war whose market values grew significantly
above the book value over time while only the prevailing capital gains taxes
τT prevented them from divesting. In this case, and that was arguably the
underlying rationale of the tax reform efforts, inefficient investments were
disposed. However, the majority of corporate owners were industrial firms
with substantial strategic interests in their investee firms; these may even
have exceeded the monetary benefits provided by the tax repeal. Accord-
ingly, Edwards et al. (2004) and Weber (2009) raise doubts whether the tax
reform had any significant effect on the divestment decisions of non-financial
corporations.
Individual Shareholders
As discussed above, individual shareholders (g = C) were granted a compa-
rably small tax relief within the Tax Reduction Act. The pre-reform capital
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gains tax rate τC was reduced to an effective tax burden of τC0 in 2002, such
that following condition was to hold to make individuals keeping their equity
holdings:
V S > [1− τt0 ](V M − V B). (3)
Despite the relatively small tax incentives provided by the tax reform
([τC− τC0 ](V M −V B)), individual shareholders may have reacted much more
strongly to the tax reform once we consider their rather low strategic interests
in their investees as a result of naturally lacking industrial affiliations. An
initial confirmation for this prediction is found by Weber (2009) who reports
a decline of individual and family stockholding after the tax change came
into force.
2.3.2 Investee View
The blockholder’s decision to invest or divest usually results in a change
in the ownership concentration of the invested firm. In turn, we suggest a
change in the ownership concentration to come along with a reshuffling of
the trade-off between benefits and costs of having a blockholder in place.
As Sautner and Villalonga (2010) outline, ownership concentration can act
as a double-edged sword since controlling investors can mitigate the agency
problem between management and external shareholders through monitor-
ing, but at the same time they may realize substantial private benefits at the
expense of the minority shareholders.
In detail, we assume the marginal shareholder to face two opposing kinds
of agency costs. First, there are substantial management entrenchment costs
m stemming from rent-seeking and empire-building behavior of the manage-
ment that is eventually resulting in inefficient resource allocation (Berle and
Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976, Jensen, 1986). However, allowing
for various degrees of costly monitoring effort – depending on the size of the
equity stake α the controlling owner holds in the investee (for α < 100%)
– the total management entrenchment costs m are reduced with increasing
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ownership concentration:5
m = F ×
(
1
α
)
. (4)
As the fixed management perquisites F and the control concentration
α stand in a reciprocally proportional relation to each other, we propose a
purchase of additional shares to reduce the total management entrenchment
costs m. At the same, the equity stake α entitles the controlling owner to ex-
tract compensating benefits of control b, consisting of shared and unshared
private benefits. Shared benefits from blockholding, which are considered
beneficial for both the controlling and the minority shareholders, compen-
sate for costly monitoring activities (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Holderness,
2003). Beyond that, with increasing equity concentration – and therefore di-
minished risk diversification opportunities – the controlling owner demands
an additional compensation for his growing risk exposure that is subsumed
under the unshared benefits (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Admati et al., 1994).
In consequence, we suggest total private benefits to be a function of control
ownership concentration, b ≡ f(α) with db
dα
> 0.
As outlined above, the magnitude of each of the agency costs – the man-
agement entrenchment costs m and the private benefits b – vary with own-
ership concentration α. Furthermore, these agency costs are in a trade-off
relation – conditional on α but homogenous across owner types g – to each
other while constituting the total agency costs c. We therefore argue that
each control concentration level α, may it be for example 20% or 36%, cor-
responds to a particular amount of total agency costs c(m, b), and thus to a
certain market value V M :
V M = V ⋆ − c(m, b) (5)
where V ⋆ denotes the firm value in absence of any agency costs in a perfect
capital market. Above reasoning about the trade-off of agency problems in
5The fixed costs of monitoring activities are usually argued to be fully borne in a block
by the largest shareholder, but it is argued that she benefits only in proportion to her stake;
thus only large blockholders are able and sufficiently incentivized to monitor (Grossmann
and Hart, 1988).
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a non-perfect market suggests an optimal ownership concentration level α∗
that minimizes the total agency costs c:
min c = c(F ×
(
1
α
)
, f(α)) (6)
The effect of a marginal increase in control ownership concentration –
induced by the Tax Reduction Act – on the total agency costs and thus on
firm value can then be derived from a simple comparative static exercise (see
similarly Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004)6:
dc
dα
=
∂c
∂α
+
∂c
∂f(α)
f ′(α)
= c1F + c2f
′(α) (7)
where c1 < 0 and c2 > 0.
A marginal increase in ownership concentration – evaluated at the cur-
rent control concentration level – reduces the total agency costs and thus is
value enhancing as long as the marginal gains from additional monitoring
c1F exceed the corresponding marginal costs from extracted private benefits
c2f
′(α), such that −c1F ≥ c2f ′(α). Correspondingly, a negative marginal
effect of ownership concentration reflects that the costs from compensatory
private benefits extracted by the controlling owner outweigh the costs saved
from curbing management inefficiencies by strengthened monitoring efforts.
These theoretical predictions are used for our subsequent empirical analysis
to assess the average impact of the reform-induced changes in control concen-
tration. Also, the developed approach helps to understand the mixed results
of ownership concentration reported in numerous studies (see Goergen et al.
(2008)). For Continental Europe, Thomsen et al. (2006) find a negative
association between blockholder concentration and firm performance while
6We borrow this static model from Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) who derive
the value of a statistical life from the trade-off between speed gain and mortality risk
exogenously changed by mandated speed limits in the U.S.
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pointing towards a dominating conflict between the blockholder and minor-
ity shareholders. Translated into our model, they suggest private benefits for
compensating the monitoring efforts to exceed the cost savings from curbing
management perquisites, hence −c1F < c2f ′(α).
To finish our model, the optimal ownership concentration α∗ that mini-
mizes the total agency costs then satisfies the following relationship:
α∗ ≡ − F
f ′(α)
=
c2
c1
(8)
When the above equation is satisfied, management perquisites saved per
extracted marginal private benefits is equal to the marginal rate of substitu-
tion between entrenchment costs and private benefits costs.
2.4 Data and Descriptives
2.4.1 Sample
Observation Period
Starting point of our empirical analysis is a sample of all CDAX-listed firms
in Germany observed at the year-ends of 2000-2003, as we consider the two
pre-tax reform years 2000 (t0 − 2) and 2001 (t0 − 1), the coming into force
year of the tax reform 2002 (t0) and the post-reform year 2003 (t0 + 1). In
our base case, we analyze the data of the pre-reform (t0 − 1) and the reform
year-end (t0). For robustness purpose, we then extend the observation period
to t0 − 2 and t0 + 1.
Ownership Data
All ownership data included are hand-collected from the Wer geho¨rt zu
wem? -database published by Commerzbank. Throughout our study, owner-
ship concentration is confined to the equity stake of the controlling investor
as we assume equity concentration in the hand of the largest owner to pri-
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marily affect the total agency costs.7 Our measure of control ownership refers
to voting rights at the direct ownership level while implicitly assuming the
‘one share-one vote’ principle to hold.
Moreover, the information on the type of the controlling owner – with re-
spect to its tax regime – is identified. We distinguish between investors that
fall under the corporate tax law and are thus subject to the repeal of the
corporate capital gains tax (g1=Corp), mainly German AGs and GmbHs.
Individual investors (g2=Indiv), including families and community of heirs,
are subject to the personal income taxation law and are therefore affected
by the half-income method. The remaining owners are assigned to the fol-
lowing tax types: non-incorporated firms (g3=Non-incorp), foreign investors
(g4=Foreign), and public investors (g5=State). Firms that are reported to
have no blockholder are deemed to have a dispersed ownership structure with
the largest owner to hold < 5% of all issued shares. Please see the Appendix
to learn in detail about the assignment rules we applied compiling the various
groups of owner tax types gj.
We additionally segregate our data by controlling owner types observed
at the end of 2001 (t0−1). All firms that were held at this time by corporate
blockholders Corp are assigned to the treatment group Ti, whereas all firms
controlled by individual investors Indiv are assigned to the control group
Ci – irrespective of the controlling owner type observed in the subsequent
years. These two major shareholder groups (Franks and Mayer, 2001) form
our restricted sample.
Final Dataset
Complementary to our collected ownership data, we retrieved all necessary
financial data from Worldscope / Datastream while excluding all financial
firms (SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4949) from our sample. We
eventually arrive at a total of 1542 firm year observations for our unrestricted
sample carrying complete ownership and financial information over the course
7In addition, the equity stake of the second largest owner affects the extent of the
private benefits taken out by the controlling owner, yet the impact is found to be rather
ambiguous (Edwards and Weichenrieder, 2004).
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of 2000-2003. This setting allows us to gain an alternative sight on the
ownership development and its impact on firm valuation as we assume the
viewpoint of the investee CDAX corporation that is indirectly affected by
the Tax Reduction Act through the tax type gj of its controlling owner.
2.4.2 Summary Statistics
Overall Ownership Development in Germany
In this section, we will first have a look at the overall development of con-
trol ownership followed by a detailed analysis of the evolution of ownership
concentration split by the investor tax types gj. Table 1 presents the overall
development of the average ownership concentration (All) of all CDAX-firms
under investigation during the early 2000’s. In accordance with prior studies
on ownership development centering around the tax reform in Germany (e.g.
Weber, 2009; Fehre et al. 2011), we observe a slight decline over time with
an average control concentration of 50.90% in 2000 (t0 − 2) and 48.30% in
2003 (t0 + 1).
However, what strikes the reader most when studying Table 1 is that
the number of firms held by Corp and consequently their average ownership
concentration increased from 2000 (23.81%) to 2003 (26.34%). This finding
gives us a preliminary indication of the Tax Reduction Act to have caused
the average corporate shareholder to retain or to even built up its equity
blockholding. That is in contrast to existing literature attributing the overall
reduction in control concentration to substantial divestitures of financial and
non-financial corporate blockholders.8
Please insert Table 1 approximately here
8For example, Weber (2009) reports the share of industrial firms – of any legal form
– in non-financial corporations to decrease significantly from 2001 to 2005. In contrast
to our approach and data, she does not consider the legal form of the controlling owner,
and further uses data provided by the Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzaufsicht (BAFin) for four
points in time: January 1, 1999; January 1, 2001; January 1, 2003; January 1, 2005.
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Ownership Development over the Tax Reform Period
In order to gain a more comprehensive insight into the effects of the Tax
Reduction Act, we focus on firms observed in both the pre-reform year 2001
(t0 − 1) and the reform year 2002 (t0). All firms observed only in one of the
two years are dropped in order to rule out systematic composition changes.
We are now able to properly explore how ownership concentration developed
from t0 − 1 to t0 while allowing for switches of the controlling owner across
same period. We place emphasis on the treatment Ti and the control group
Ci, thus on firms identified in t0− 1 to be controlled by either Corp or Indiv.
According to Table 2, we find 130 of in total 322 firms belonging to the
treatment group Ti, 115 to the control group Ci, 26 to be controlled by
Foreign, 23 by Non-incorp, 10 by State and 18 firms to be characterized by
dispersed ownership by the end of t0−1. If we now follow the argumentation
of existing literature, we would expect the number of those firms identified
in t0 − 1 to be of the treated Ti to have either declined from t0 − 1 to t0 (as
another controlling owner took over), or to have at least experienced a drop in
ownership concentration. On the contrary, we find 118 (91%) firms of the 130
initially identified treated firms Ti to be still controlled by Corp in t0, with
an increase of the average equity stake by 2.13 percentage points compared
to t0 − 1. Or to put differently, 155 firms (+ 25 firms) are found in t0 to
be held by Corp as 18 firms underwent a change of control ownership from
Indiv in t0 − 1 to Corp in t0, 6 firms each with initial Foreign, Non− Inc
and dispersed ownership. These changes in the controlling owner suggest a
liquidity effect as individual blockholders tended to provide a supply of stock
whereas corporate shareholders rather showed additional demand. Overall,
the ownership concentration of those 130 firms assigned to Ti in t0−1 elevated
by 1.92%.
Firms controlled by Indiv at the end of t0−1, hence assigned to the con-
trol group Ci, took a contrary ownership development: out of the initially
identified 115 firms, only 93 (81%) remained in control while associated con-
centration decreased by 1.51%. Control concentration of all firms assigned
to Ci in t0 − 1 went down on average by 0.93% – irrespective of the investor
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type in t0. It is worth to be noted that dispersed ownership (Dispersed) be-
came less frequent over the reform period; 18 firms had a dispersed ownership
structure in t0 − 1, only 8 at the end of t0.
Please insert Table 2 approximately here
Table 3 helps to shed further light on the question to which extent eq-
uity concentration – beyond mean changes – remained constant or adjusted
during the reform year t0 across the investor tax types gj initially identified
at the end of t0 − 1. Half of all firms (164 of 322) experienced no ownership
adjustments, whereas 29% (93) underwent an increase in concentration, 20%
(65) experienced a decline. Interestingly, if we apply the same approach to
the pre-reform period we find strong support for a rather inelastic ownership
structure prior to the reform period (see also Koeke, 2001). Indeed, Table
4 reports a stable ownership pattern for 80% (258) of all firms from t0 − 2
to t0 − 1. This finding underpins our assertion that the tax reform induced
substantial overall exogenous variation in ownership concentration.
Please insert Table 3 approximately here
Please insert Table 4 approximately here
In more detail, Table 5 depicts that in 60% (78 of 130) of all treated firms
(Ti firms) control ownership kept unchanged, while 26% (34) of these firms
became more concentrated by on average 13 percentage points. 14% (18) of
the treated firms lost concentration by an average share block of 11%. This
suggests that corporate investors with substantial inefficient stakes, i.e. the
policy makers’ major target group, constituted only the minority (14%) of
all corporations treated with the corporate tax repeal. Therefore, it can be
inferred that the strategic value of most of the treated firms was at least
as high as the market value after the repeal of the corporate tax on capital
gains, thus αV ST ≥ αV MT applied to the majority of Ti firms in t0.
At first glance, an average concentration change of -0.93% is reported for
the control group Ci. Looking beyond this figure we find 41% (47 out of 115)
of these firms to not have undergone any adjustments of control ownership.
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Control concentration was reduced in 32% (37) of the firms, whereas 27%
(31) of all Ci firms experienced a growth in concentration from t0 − 1 to t0.
The average share disposals were as large as the block acquisitions (around
16%); in contrast, the average block sales of the treated firms Ti are reported
to be less pronounced (10.73%). Summing up, we find a significantly higher
stability for the Ti firms in ownership concentration (60% of Ti vs 40.87% of
Ci) with less sales (13.85% vs 32.17%) – although the corporate investors of
these firms were more strongly incentivized by larger tax exemptions.
When analyzing the restricted sample consisting of the treatment group
Ti and the control group firms Ci, Table 5 again provides evidence for an
exogenous variation of ownership concentration induced by the tax reform.
While Panel A documents a strong difference in control concentration across
the treatment Ti and the control group Ci during the reform period (from
t0− 1 to t0), similar patterns for both groups with respect to high ownership
stability (about 80% of each group did not change ownership) are found for
the pre-reform phase (from t0 − 2 to t0 − 1) – as depicted in Panel B of
Table 5. This pattern supports the assertion of a frozen equity market prior
to the tax reform as well as a reform-induced exogenous variation in control
concentration.
Please insert Table 5 approximately here
2.4.3 Identification Strategy
In order to reveal the true effect of the Tax Reduction Act, we exploit the
differences in ownership concentration and firm value across owner groups (Ti
vs Ci) and time (t0 − 1 vs t0). To recall, being held by either Corp or Indiv
at the end of t0− 1 determines the firm’s indirect exposure to the tax-reform
in t0. Table 6 compares the ownership concentration and firm value of firms
that had little indirect exposure to the tax reductions (Ci firms) to those
that were strongly affected (Ti firms).
The significantly higher ownership concentration of the treated firms in
t0−1 (57% vs. 46%) arguably reflects the reform provision to give corporate
controlling owners higher incentives to divest. Though one may predict the
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reform to have a greater effect for firms with higher exposure to the tax
concessions, we find that ownership concentration of the treated firms even
increased by 1.92% in t0, whereas we see a slight decline in the control group’s
ownership concentration by 0.93%. At the same time, the differential in firm
value increased to 0.107 log points of Tobin’s Q in favor of the treated firms.
Please insert Table 6 approximately here
The difference in the above presented differences can be interpreted as
the causal effect of the Tax Reduction Act – under the key assumption that
all unequal developments in both outcomes (i.e., control ownership concen-
tration and firm value) across the two groups are only due to the tax reform.
Furthermore, we rule out any self-selection of investors into treatment with
respect to a potential anticipation of the reform’s tax concessions as the an-
nouncement of the tax reform came surprisingly (Edwards et al. (2004))
to the market along with a restriction of share disposal to long-term equity
stakes.
2.5 Estimation Framework
2.5.1 The Effect of the Tax Reform on Ownership Concentration
and Firm Value
We now aim to translate the above described identification strategy of com-
paring differences in outcomes – ownership concentration and firm value –
between the end of 2001 (t0− 1) and 2002 (t0) as well as across both groups,
Ti and Ci, into a regression framework.
The Effect of the Tax Reform on Ownership Concentration
For estimating the average treatment effect of the treated (ATT)9 on control
concentration, we apply a common Difference-in-Difference estimator (DiD):
9We are only able to identify ATT (not the average treatment effect ATE) as we can
assume heterogeneous treatment effects by our assertion that strategic valuation and thus
the impact of tax incentives differ across both groups . Thus, if we simply swap tax reform
exposure for both groups (i.e. Indiv were treated with full tax repeal), we would probably
gain different results.
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γDiD = E[Ot0 −Ot0−1|T = 1]− E[Ot0 −Ot0−1|T = 0] (9)
where the first bracket represents the average change in control ownership
concentration Oi of the treatment group Ti, and the second bracket denotes
the average concentration change of the control group Ci, each from t0−1 to
t0. The estimate γˆ
DID gives us then the causal effect of treatment intensity by
the Tax Reduction Act on ownership concentration. If the incentives of the
tax reform led to a decrease of ownership concentration, as the policy makers
were reasoning, the difference in the development of ownership concentration
would be negatively related to the investee’s indirect exposure to the reform.
This suggests running the following regression (Duflo, 2001):
Oit = c0 + δ1t0 + η1Ti + γ1(t0 × Ti) +W ′itβ + (W ′it × Ti)βTi + ϵit (10)
where Oit denotes the ownership concentration of firm i in year t, c0
represents the omitted group effect of the control group Ci while Ti is a
dummy indicating whether the firm is assigned to the treatment group. The
interaction of the reform year variable t0 and the treatment dummy (Ti,
t0 × Ti) captures the firm’s exposure to the tax reform whose impact γ1
on ownership concentration is aimed to be estimated. A 1 × k vector of
observable firm characteristics Wit is included, as well as interaction terms
of the firm characteristics with the treatment group indicator, (Wit × Ti), in
order to account for heterogenous effects of the covariates. An overview of our
control variables is attached to the Appendix. The error term ϵit is assumed
to consist of a idiosyncratic error component ϑit and a fixed firm-specific error
component µi which we account for by performing fixed-effects regressions.
The key identifying assumption for our DiD estimator is that γ1 turns zero
in the absence of the tax reforms, which implies that macroeconomic effects
are not allowed to differ systematically across both firm groups. For proper
identification, the group effects of Ti (c0 + η1) and Ci (c0) are also required
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to be constant over time.10
The first three columns of Table 7 report the estimates of the reform’s
intensity on control ownership concentration while using three different spec-
ifications. The first is a plain regression with no control variables, the second
specification controls for the impact of firm characteristics Wit and thirdly,
we control for potential heterogenous effects ofWit across both groups. Panel
A of Table 7 covers the reform phase, which comprises the pre-reform year
2001 (t0 − 1) and the reform-year 2002 (t0).
As a robustness exercise, we consider a potentially slower ownership ad-
justment process of the treatment group towards the reform’s incentives by
additionally including the post-reform year 2003 (t0 + 1). As presented in
Panel B of Table 7, the treatment intensity of the reform (t0) and the post-
reform (t0 + 1) years are accounted for in a twofold way: first, we subsume
both years under a single reform/post-reform period (t01 × Ti), second is to
consider the reform intensity of both years separately by including the inter-
actions (t0 × Ti) and (t0+1 × Ti) into our regression equation. This approach
delivers an indication whether the effect of the tax reform was rather short-
or long-lived.
Please insert Table 7 approximately here
The estimates in Panel A of Table 7 suggest that higher indirect reform
exposure increased ownership concentration in the investee firm significantly,
once we account for firm characteristics (Columns (2)-(3)). This estimated
positive control concentration effect of the tax reform is economically sub-
stantial and increases with control precision up to 3.8%. The results in
Column (3) in Panel B confirm the positive concentration effect of higher
reform exposure even when adding the post-reform year t0+1. The positive
effect of the tax reform is suggested to be even slightly stronger in the post-
reform year (4.27%) than in the reform year (4.01%). However, the results
10Proper identification also hinges on the prerequisite that the tax reform itself is truly
exogenous (for discussion on this, see Besley and Case, 2000), as the policy maker imple-
mented the tax reform in anticipation of a certain outcome (i.e. reduction of concentration
of corporate controlling owners Ti, in particular of banks and insurance companies).
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for the post-reform year t0 + 1 should be taken with some caution as the
controlling investor may have changed again from t0 to t0 + 1 (compared to
initial identification at the end of t0 − 1).11
The Effect of the Tax Reform on Firm Value
Analogously to the analysis of control ownership, we can write a restricted
reduced-form relationship between the indirect exposure to the Tax Reduc-
tion Act and firm value of the investee. Therefore, we run the above intro-
duced regression approach accordingly:
yit = c0 + δ1t0 + η1Ti + γ1(t0 × Ti) +W ′itβ + (W ′it × Ti)βTi + ξit (11)
only now with yit denoting the log of Tobin’s Q of firm i at time t.
Similarly, we perform regressions additionally accounting for the post-reform
year (t0 + 1).
All estimated effects of reform exposure (t0 × Ti) on firm value are sig-
nificantly greater than 0, as shown in Columns (4)-(6) in Panel A of Table
7. The estimates range from 5.9 to 7.1 percentage points of log Tobin’s Q.
Panel B reports the positive effect of reform exposure to hold with weak sig-
nificance even when additional considering the year 2003 (t01). For the full
set of covariates (Column 6), we estimate a positive reform effect of 5.2%
of log Tobin’s Q. However, when considering t0 and t0 + 1 separately, our
estimates suggest the positive effect of the reform on firm value to fade with
time as only a significant value effect of 6.2% is reported for the very reform
year. Our results imply that the Tax Reduction Act caused a more favorable
development for these firms whose controlling owner benefitted most from
tax concessions (Corp).
Furthermore, the results even suggest that the positive reform effect on
Tobin’s Q may be attributed to the above discussed changes in ownership
11A change in the investor type at the end of t0 comes along with a different capital gain
taxation of the new owner, plus another strategic value of the firm under investigation. In
turn, the corresponding adjustment behavior of the new controlling owner of type gj may
alter as well.
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concentration – also caused by the Tax Reduction Act. The next section will
take up this proposed relationship.
2.5.2 The Effect of Ownership Concentration on Firm Value
OLS Estimation
In the previous chapter we learned that a high indirect exposure to the Tax
Reduction Act had a positive impact on both control concentration and firm
value. Beyond that, we are keen to study the linkage between the changes in
ownership concentration and firm value of the investee firm. Therefore, the
structural form equation for this relationship with respect to the reform year
t0 is:
yi = a0 + ϕ1Oi +W
′
iβ + εi (12)
where yi denotes the log of Tobin’s Q, and Oi the control concentration
in firm i in 2002; Wi is again a set of firm characteristics.
Please insert Table 8 approximately here
The corresponding ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the effect of
control concentration on firm value (ϕ1) are reported in Columns (1)-(4) of
Table 8; the results for the unrestricted sample featuring all investor types
gj are reported in Columns (1)-(2), the results with respect to the restricted
sample only considering the treated Ti and control group firms Ci are pro-
vided in Columns (3) to (4). For both samples, the estimates are positive and
statistically different from 0 with higher coefficients for the restricted sample
(0.0029 log points) than for the unrestricted sample (0.0019 log points). The
estimated effects are robust against the inclusion of industry effects (Column
(2) and (4)). In words, a 1% increase in ownership concentration – evaluated
at the mean concentration level – increases the investee’s firm value in the
restricted sample by approximately 0.29%. Though not reported, we find
no evidence for a non-monotonic relationship between control ownership and
firm value.
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IV Estimation
However, running OLS regressions of equation (11) may lead to biased esti-
mates of the effect of control concentration on firm value if there is correlation
between Oi and εi – an issue frequently addressed in the literature (Demsetz
and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). To overcome this endo-
geneity problem, we are required to find an instrument that does not affect
firm valuation other than by a change in ownership concentration. We ar-
gue that the exogenous variation in control concentration caused by the Tax
Reduction Act provides an appropriate instrument, i.e. being ‘randomly’
controlled by Corp or Indiv at the end of t0 − 1, thus assigned to Ti or Ci.
In detail, the reform’s tax reductions unveiled the heterogenous value premia
that the investors attached to the investee firms, and in turn caused them
to differently adjust their equity stakes in t0. As outlined in section 3.1,
corporate shareholders are assumed to add a substantial value premium to
their investee firms as they retrieve additional benefits from close industry
affiliations. This fact arguably prevented corporate shareholders to divest
their block holdings, though they were strongly incentivized to do so by the
tax repeal. In contrast, individual shareholders responded rather strongly to
comparably low tax concessions as their investments were less of strategic
than solely of financial interest. As discussed in our theoretical model in
section 3.2, we further suggest a homogenous monitoring and expropriation
behavior across controlling owner types with respect to certain concentration
levels. The shifts in the ownership structure across shareholder groups and
time – as shown in Table 5 – support the assertion of our binary instrument
Ti to fulfill the conditions E[Tt0−1, εt0 ] = 0 and E[Tt0−1, Ot0 ] ̸= 0.12
The Columns (5)-(6) of Table 8 present the instrumental variable (IV)
estimates on the restricted sample of the same equation (11). The point
estimates of the marginal effect of ownership concentration (0.006) are larger
than the OLS estimates and significant at the 5% level.
Relating our estimated positive effects of ownership concentration on firm
12We add an additional index t0− 1 to Ti to highlight at this point that the assignment
to either the treatment or the control group is based on the owner type observed in t0−1,
thus Tt0−1 is synonymous with Ti.
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value to the predictions of our theoretical model, we can infer that additional
control in the hands of the controlling owner and thus greater monitoring
efforts caused a more favorable trade-off between curbing managerial excess
and additional costs of private benefits b, i.e. −c1F ≥ c2f ′(α). This effect is
value enhancing.
2.6 Conclusion and Discussion
Recent literature on the ownership development in Germany associates the
overall declining ownership concentration documented during the early 2000s
with the repeal of corporate capital gains taxation introduced under the 2000
Tax Reduction Act. The elimination of the tax barrier was intended to en-
courage corporate investors to divest their block holdings and to establish a
more dispersed corporate ownership structure in Germany. In stark contrast,
surveying a sample of CDAX firms with blockholders differently exposed to
the Tax Reduction Act, we find a positive ownership concentration effect of
around 4% in those firms with a corporate controlling shareholder. We at-
tribute this exogenous shift in share structure to the joint work of the reform’s
tax barrier reductions and the existence of heterogeneous value premia. Fur-
thermore, the value impact of strong tax reform exposure is estimated to be
around 6.5% in firm value. Exploiting again the reform-induced exogenous
variation in ownership concentration, our results lend some support to the
conclusion that the positive value effect was caused by the increase in control
concentration. In this respect, our IV estimates suggest a downward bias in
the OLS estimates of the causal linkage between ownership concentration
and firm value. According to the predictions of our theoretical model, we
claim that higher control concentration leads to stronger monitoring of the
management outweighing the additional costs of extracted private benefits,
which is in total value enhancing. Our findings are of crucial interest as they
suggest that the repeal of corporate capital gains taxation was effective in
creating value, but not through a more dispersed ownership structure as it
was intended by the policy makers.
Although we come to rather surprising findings, we are still able to recon-
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cile our theoretical predictions and empirical results to the outcomes of pre-
vious studies on this topic which mainly focus on the tax repeal for corporate
investors or even only on the reform’s impact on financial institutions. Gen-
erally, we believe that only the joint consideration of both major shareholder
groups – financial and non-financial corporate and individual shareholders
– permits a proper understanding of the mechanisms and the impact of the
Tax Reduction Act on the development of ownership concentration and firm
value in Germany.
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Tables
Table 1: Development of ownership concentration
The table provides the overall ownership concentration of the controlling owner over the
years 2000-2003. Number and fraction (in %) of each owner type on the overall concen-
tration is further presented.
Ownertype 2000 2001 2002 2003 Total
All Obs. 359 385 395 403 1542
Av. conc. 50.88 50.51 49.63 48.31
Dispersed Obs. 20 21 9 13 63
Av. conc. 1.90 0.82 0.36 0.33
Corp Obs. 148 159 191 196 694
Av. conc. 23.81 24.74 27.51 26.34
Non-incorp Obs. 20 25 19 20 84
Av. conc. 17.20 16.58 13.85 12.88
Indiv Obs. 130 138 134 125 527
Av. conc. 2.42 2.87 2.72 3.02
State Obs. 10 10 12 12 44
Av. conc. 1.35 1.24 1.43 1.33
Foreign Obs. 31 32 30 37 130
Av. conc. 4.21 4.26 3.75 4.41
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Table 2: Changes in ownership concentration across owner types from 2001 to
2002 (tax reform period)
The table shows the frequency (Obs.) of controlling owner type switches and corresponding
average share blocks traded (∆) from the pre-tax reform year t0 − 1 (2001) to the end of
the tax reform year t0 (2002).
Disp. Corp Non-inc Indiv State Foreign Total t0 − 1
Dispersed Obs. 5 6 3 4 18
∆ conc. 0.00 22.31 26.76 21.78 16.73
Corp Obs. 118 2 5 5 130
∆ conc. 2.13 0.27 -0.66 0.20 1.92
Non-inc Obs. 6 16 1 23
∆ conc. 4.34 0.12 -1.70 1.14
Indiv Obs. 2 18 93 1 1 115
∆ conc. -51.17 7.63 -1.51 -8.39 6.56 -0.93
State Obs. 1 9 10
∆ conc. 0.00 -3.49 -3.14
Foreign Obs. 1 6 3 16 26
∆ conc. -5.73 2.31 2.80 3.32 2.68
Total t0 Obs. 8 155 18 105 10 26 322
∆ conc. -13.51 3.63 0.14 -0.54 -3.98 5.69 1.58
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Table 3: Block trades from 2001 to 2002 (tax reform period)
The table shows the extent (frequency: Obs.; average trade volume: ∆) of block trades
from the pre-tax reform year t0 − 1 (2001) to the end of the tax reform year t0 (2002) for
each owner type observed in t0−1. Block trades of the controlling owner are characterized
by no change: ±1%, purchase: > 1%, sales: < 1%.
No change > 1% < 1% Total t0 − 1
Dispersed Obs. 5 13 18
∆ conc. 0.00 23.17 16.73
Corp T Obs. 78 34 18 130
∆ conc. 0.10 12.81 -10.73 1.92
Non-inc Obs. 12 6 5 23
∆ conc. 0.02 10.76 -7.70 1.14
Indiv C Obs. 47 31 37 115
∆ conc. -0.03 15.84 -16.13 -0.93
State Obs. 9 1 10
∆ conc. 0.03 -31.65 -3.14
Foreign Obs. 13 9 4 26
∆ conc. -0.06 10.81 -6.70 2.68
Total t0 Obs. 164 93 65 322
∆ conc. 0.04 14.94 -13.64 1.58
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Table 4: Block trades from 2000 to 2001 (pre-tax reform period)
The table shows the extent (frequency: Obs.; average trade volume: ∆) of block trades
from t0 − 2 (2000) to t0 − 1 (2001) for each owner type observed in t0 − 2. Block trades
of the controlling owner are characterized by no material change: ±1%, purchase: > 1%,
sales: < 1%.
No change > 1% < 1% Total t0 − 2
Dispersed Obs. 14 3 17
∆ conc. 0.00 29.00 5.12
Corp Obs. 109 11 11 131
∆ conc. 0.02 19.90 -6.80 1.12
Non-incorp Obs. 16 2 18
∆ conc. 0.02 14.67 1.65
Indiv Obs. 91 11 13 115
∆ conc. 0.00 17.29 -18.08 -0.39
State Obs. 7 3 10
∆ conc. 0.00 -7.01 -2.10
Foreign Obs. 21 5 4 30
∆ conc. -0.02 31.53 -34.28 0.67
Total t0 − 1 Obs. 258 32 31 321
∆ conc. 0.01 21.35 -15.10 0.68
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Table 5: Development of block trades over time
Comparison of block trades between pre-tax reform period (2000-2001) and tax reform
period (2001-2002) for the restricted sample (T and C).
No change > 1% < 1% Total t0 − k
Panel A: 2001-2002
Corp T Obs. 78 60.00% 34 26.15% 18 13.85% 130
∆ conc. 0.10 12.81 -10.73 1.92
Indiv C Obs. 47 40.87% 31 26.96% 37 32.17% 115
∆ conc. -0.03 15.84 -16.13 -0.93
Total t0 125 51.02% 65 26.53% 55 22.45% 245
Panel B: 2000-2001
Corp Obs. 109 83.21% 11 8.40% 11 8.40% 131
∆ conc. 0.02 19.90 -6.80 1.12
Indiv Obs. 91 79.13% 11 9.57% 13 11.30% 115
∆ conc. 0.00 17.29 -18.08 -0.39
Total t0 − 1 200 81.30% 22 8.94% 24 9.76% 246
Table 6: Differences in means
Means of ownership concentration and log(Tobin’s Q) by owner type (T and C) and
across tax reform period (2001-2002). Statistical significance levels of mean differences are
reported at *** p<0.0, **p< 0.05, * p<0.10. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
Concentration Log(Tobin’s Q)
Indiv C Corp T Difference Indiv C Corp T Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No of firms 115 130 115 130
t0 − 1 (2001) 46.256 56.581 -10.330*** 0.446 0.482 -0.036
(2.099) (2.525) (3.333) (0.034) (0.032) (0.047)
t0 (2002) 45.326 58.504 -13.180*** 0.297 0.404 -0.107***
(2.237) (2.534) (3.419) (0.028) (0.029) (0.041)
Difference 0.930 -1.920 0.149*** 0.078*
(3.068) (3.578) (0.044) (0.044)
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Table 7: Effect of the tax reform on concentration and firm value
Coefficients of the interaction of between treatment group T and tax-reform year t0. All
specifications include the treatment group dummy T and the year of the tax reform t0.
Included control variables Wit are firm size, leverage, EBIT/sales, cash/ta, sales growth
and a dummy indicating payout of cash dividends. Heterogenous effects of control variables
are controlled for by the interaction of the treatment group dummy with each control
variable Wit × Ti. t0 denotes the tax-reform year (2002), t0+1 the year after (2003).
We performed firm-fixed effects regressions with standard errors clustered on firm level.
Statistical significance levels are reported at *** p<0.01, **p< 0.05, * p<0.10. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
Oit Concentration yit Log(Tobin’s Q)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: 2001 vs 2002
t0 × Ti 2.8531 3.3791* 3.7699* 0.0707** 0.0587** 0.0649**
(1.907) (2.038) (2.169) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Wit No No Yes No No Yes
Wit × Ti No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Obs. 490 474 474 490 474 474
No of firms 245 242 242 245 242 242
Panel B: 2001 vs 2002/2003
t01 × Ti 3.1797 3.2802 4.1476* 0.0465 0.0495* 0.0518*
(1.977) (2.105) (2.198)
t0 × Ti 3.0997 3.1347 4.0111* 0.0599** 0.0639** 0.0623**
(1.945) (2.069) (2.141) (0.030) (0.031) (0.032)
t0+1 × Ti 3.2596 3.4274 4.2740* 0.0331 0.0330 0.0299
(2.237) (2.370) (2.549) (0.036) (0.033) (0.035)
Wit No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Wit × Ti No No Yes No No Yes
Obs. 696 680 680 696 680 680
No of firms 232 232 232 232 232 232
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Table 8: Effect of ownership concentration adjustment on firm value (log To-
bin’s Q)
This table shows the regression of log of Tobin’s Q on ownership concentration Oi with
respect to the tax-reform year 2002 t0. Included control variables Wi contain firm size,
leverage, EBIT/sales, cash/ta, sales growth and a dummy indicating payout of cash div-
idends. Industry effects are controlled for by Fama-French 12 industry classification (FF
12). OLS regressions are performed on the unrestricted sample, columns (1)-(2), and
the restricted sample, columns (3)-(4). Small-sample statistics are applied on the IV-
estimations, columns (5)-(6). Only the results of the second stage of the IV regression
are reported in the table. Statistical significance levels are reported at *** p<0.01, **p<
0.05, * p<0.10. Heteroscedastic-robust standard errors are applied on each specification
and are reported in parenthesis.
OLS Wald (IV)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Oi 0.0019*** 0.0019*** 0.0028*** 0.0029*** 0.0066** 0.0061**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Wi yes yes yes yes yes yes
FF12 no yes no yes no yes
Obs. 316 316 241 241 241 241
R2 0.343 0.385 0.343 0.391 0.242 0.322
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The majority of studies on the value impact of ownership con-
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geneity. This paper suggests control concentration to be additionally
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3.1 Introduction
It has been an old and long time discussion whether ownership concentration,
thus the concentration of shares in the hands of a controlling blockholder, is
value increasing or destroying. The theoretical background is briefly told, it is
the story about a double edged sword often encountered in fairy tales. There
is the light side of ownership concentration coming from the proposition that
large shareholders have greater power and incentives to ensure shareholder
value maximization as diffuse ownership facilitates entrenchment by man-
agers (Berle and Means, 1932). That is done by monitoring the management,
which is beneficial to all shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Zeckhouser
and Pound, 1990). On the flip side, ownership concentration may exacerbate
agency problems as the controlling shareholders might misuse their power to
consume private benefits at the expense of minority shareholders which even-
tually leads to a discount on the firm value (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, control concentration may reduce managerial
initiative by over-monitoring (Burkart, 1997).
The effect of ownership concentration is further argued to depend on the
investment horizon of the controlling shareholder. Gaspar et al. (2005) and
Chen et al. (2007) find long-term investors to engage in more monitoring as
they face lower costs and higher benefits of information production. However,
stable ownership is criticized to potentially worsen agency conflicts as long-
tenure investors may either find it easy to harm minority shareholders by
expropriation (Bhagat et al., 2004) or to become sleepy and passive monitors
(Bøhren et al., 2005). In consequence, the net effect of concentrated and
stable ownership is therefore a priori not clear.
Beyond that, literature addresses potential heterogeneity across control
owner types – e.g. financial, state, strategic owner – due to differences in in-
vestment objectives, governance styles, preferences and skills that may lead
to diverse outcomes with respect to effective monitoring and extraction of
private benefits (e.g. Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; Giannetti and Simonov,
2006; Cronquist and Fahlenbrach; 2008). Himmelberg et al. (1999), in addi-
tion, suggest unobserved firm heterogeneity as the one to be blamed for the
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spurious correlation between ownership and firm performance.1 As things get
even more complicated when testing the value impact of control ownership
empirically, retrieving a causal relationship between ownership structure and
firm value is found to be challenging in the presence of reverse causality. The
seminal papers by Demsetz (1983), and Demsetz and Lehn (1985) suspect
ownership structure and firm value to be simultaneously determined.
From a methodological point of view, Zhou (2001) raises concerns over
the within-group estimator commonly used to account e.g. for firm fixed
effects as variation in ownership concentration is usually rich in across-firm
variation, but small within firms when tracking ownership in a panel dataset.
He promotes instrumental variable (IV) estimators to be more appropriate
when accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
Our study considers all suggested dimensions of ownership heterogeneity
by using a more general framework: we promote the supplementary notion
of unobservable firm-owner match effects which come about when a firm i
is controlled by an investor j. This firm-owner match heterogeneity is sus-
pected to additionally distort the average effect of ownership concentration
– besides the confounding effect from firm specific heterogeneity. Thanks
to our instrumental variable approach that acts in the spirit of Altonji and
Shkotko (1987), we are able to correct for both simultaneously, firm as well
as match specific heterogeneity in order to retrieve the causal average effect
of ownership concentration. At the same time, our IV estimator cures the
problem of reverse causality. Most interestingly, this approach gives us the
opportunity to work out the direction and the relative importance of each
bias. Our econometric analysis suggests a positive relationship between qual-
ity of the firm-owner match and ownership concentration. In other words,
good – value-increasing – firm-owner matches are more likely to occur at
high ownership concentration levels. An opposite relationship, in contrast,
is found for fixed firm-effects reflecting agent quality. Eventually, our esti-
mates of the true average effect of ownership concentration – free from any
potential unobserved heterogeneity or reverse causality distortions – suggest
1In the case of Himmelberg et al. (1999), the positive effect of managerial blockholder
ownership disappears once firm fixed-effects are taken into account.
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a positive but declining effect of ownership concentration in Germany.
Out of our results, we induce a positive relationship between investment
horizon and firm-owner match quality since long-term investors are observed
to enter control at, as well as to maintain a substantially higher control stake,
than short-term investors. This in turn provides some tentative evidence for
long-term investors to be the better monitors.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
our econometric framework and our identification assumptions that help us
to remove and to contrast the two major sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Section 3 describes the data set, in particular with respect to the relationship
between ownership concentration and tenure of the controlling owner. We
present and discuss the results of our econometric exercise for the entire
sample as well as by investor types in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Estimation Framework
In this section, we introduce various regression estimators that help us to
identify, to contrast and eventually to remove possible bias that stem from
unobservable firm specific and firm-owner match heterogeneity.
3.2.1 Empirical Model
In our empirical model, we assume that the value of a firm i held by the con-
trolling owner j at time t is determined by the following regression equation:
Yijt = β1Xijt +W
′
ijtδ + εijt. (1)
The variable Yijt denotes Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm value, Xijt is
the ownership concentration2 of the controlling owner j in firm i, W ′ijt is
a 1 × k vector of observable firm characteristics3 including a constant. Our
empirical model also includes squared ownership concentration (X2ijt) in order
2In the following also referred to as control ownership or control concentration.
3We include firm size, leverage, EBIT to sales, dividend payments, sales growth,
CAPEX to sales; for definitions please refer to the Appendix. The corresponding summary
statistics are presented in Table 2.
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to account for a non-monotonic relationship between control ownership and
firm value.4 However, for the ease of demonstration, we will discuss our
estimation strategy assuming a linear effect of control ownership, but we
account for non-linear effects later in our regression analysis.
Our estimation aims at inferring causality between control ownership Xijt
and firm value Yijt; hence the key parameter of interest is β1, which is the
partial average effect of one percent additional shares in the hand of the
controlling owner. However, using pooled least squares (OLS) to estimate β1
is accused to be inappropriate as severe unobserved heterogeneity is likely to
distort the estimation of the true average effect of control concentration.
3.2.2 Error Decomposition
In order to illustrate the various potential sources of unobserved heterogene-
ity, we decompose the composite error term εijt into:
εijt = µi + φij + ηijt, (2)
where µi denotes a fixed firm specific error component, φij a fixed firm-
owner match-specific error component, and ηijt a transitory component ac-
counting for idiosyncratic shocks and random measurement error. Either
or both unobserved effects, µi and φij, may be correlated with control con-
centration Xijt and thus might cause a violation of the conditional mean
independence. This results in a biased and inconsistent estimate of the coef-
ficient β1 on control concentration.
Fixed Firm-Effect (µi)
In our context, we may connote firms with a positive fixed firm-effect µi to be
run by managers with above-average integrity; one may think of a given firm
‘technology’ that attracts a certain type of managers. This sort of managers
4In particular, a non-linear relation was documented for insider ownership concentra-
tion (e.g. Morck et al., 1988; McConnell and Servaes, 1990). They find an inverted
U-shaped relation between Tobin’s Q and managerial ownership with an ‘inflection’ point
between 40% and 50%.
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is less likely to pursue an empire building (Jensen, 1986) and self-entrenching
agenda (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), that usually causes inefficient allocation
of resources, and consequently value destruction. Expressed more techni-
cally, the infamous manager-shareholder conflict is less pronounced for firms
with positive fixed firm effects, therefore the required extent of costly moni-
toring activities is considerably lower. Generally, least square estimation of
the average effect of control ownership will not be biased as long as the un-
observable management ’quality’ is uncorrelated with control concentration,
i.e. Cov(µi, Xijt) = 0. However, in order to further scrutinize the potential
estimation bias arriving from either a positive or negative correlation, we
specify a theoretical auxiliary equation that regresses the unobserved fixed
firm-effect µi on control ownership concentration Xijt, which looks the fol-
lowing:5
µi = c1Xijt + ϑijt (3)
At this point, we are not able to unambiguously sign c1; a positive sign
would indicate good agent quality firms to be associated with rather high
control ownership, a negative c1 would speak in favor of low ownership con-
centration.
Fixed Firm-Owner Match Effect (φij)
The notion of a good firm-owner match – reflected by a positive match-
specific error component φij – may refer to a high alignment of interests
between the controlling owner j and the firm i which eventually reduces
agency costs. In contrast, unfavorable matches may come to happen once
private benefits-seeking investors encounter firms in which they can easily
do so. This scenario is particularly conceivable in firms with little minority
shareholder protection (Bruton et al., 2010). As an alternative explanation,
the monitoring ‘technology’ and thus the corresponding costs and efforts
of management monitoring may differ across blockholders (Almazan et al,
5For our illustration purpose, it is of no harm to ignore the other firm characteristics
(included in the vector W ).
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2005), and therefore lead to heterogeneous match effects. The question to
be raised again is whether good matches are more likely to occur at high
or low ownership concentration, or whether Cov(φij, Xijt) = 0. Latter case
would imply unbiased least square estimations. Similarly, the consequences
of firm-owner match heterogeneity can be analyzed by the following auxiliary
regression:
φij = b1Xijt + ξijt, (4)
while b1 may take on any sign. In case that good matches are more
likely to emerge at high (low) ownership concentration, the sign of b1 will be
positive (negative).
3.2.3 The OLS Estimator
Summarizing the potential distortions due to the various sources of unob-
servable heterogeneity introduced above, least square estimation applied to
equation (1) will yield biased estimates βOLS1 of the true average effect β1 as
of the following:
βOLS1 − β1 = b1 + c1 (5)
The total potential estimation bias – consisting of b1 and c1 – of the
true effect β1 of control ownership Xijt cannot be unambiguously determined
beforehand since the bias caused by firm-owner match heterogeneity b1 may
either offset or reinforce the bias in βOLS1 coming from firm heterogeneity c1.
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3.2.4 The Instrumental Variable (IV )-Approach
The IV1 Estimator – Correcting for Firm- and Match Heterogeneity
Following the approach of Altonji and Shkotko (1987)6, we use an instru-
mental variable estimator (IV1) that is able to remove both the bias induced
by firm and firm-owner match heterogeneity while producing an unbiased
estimate βIV 11 of the true effect of control ownership β1:
βIV 11 − β1 = 0. (6)
The appeal of this approach is that this instrumental variable is simulta-
neously uncorrelated by construction with both the firm specific error com-
ponent µi and the firm-owner match component φij. It works as follows:
e.g. given a firm i is observed to be held by the controlling owner j = 1
during the years 2003-2005 with a share of 40%, 42% and 50%, respectively.
Furthermore, the same firm i is controlled by owner j = 2 in 2006 (50%) and
2007 (54%). Then, we compute the average control concentration for each
firm-owner spell ij, which is in our example X¯i,j=1 = 44%
7 and X¯i,j=2 = 52%.
After that, we define the instrumental variable X˜ij = Xijt − X¯ij as the devi-
ation of the controlling owner’s block share j in i at time t from the average
stake she is holding during her entire control spell ij. The instrument’s ex-
pected value is zero8 and thus is uncorrelated with the unobserved firm-owner
match component, i.e. Cov(φij, X˜ij) = 0, while being very capable to explain
Xijt. We therefore consider X˜ij a valid and strong instrument for Xijt. At the
same time, this instrumental variable is also, by construction, orthogonal to
the fixed firm-effect (agent quality), so that Cov(µi, X˜ij) = 0. To make this
instrumental variable work, both unobservable effects are required to remain
constant over the control spell of the owner j. To sum it up, βIV 11 is suggested
6This estimator was first applied in the field of Labor Economics studying the the
problem of appropriately estimating the returns on work experience and tenure as both
variables are suspected to suffer from unobserved individual and job-match effects. Altonji
and Shkotko‘s (1987) estimator gave rise to further advancements in this strand of litera-
ture, as e.g. done by Topel and Ward (1992), Altonji and Williams (2005) and Dustmann
and Pereira (2008).
7For j = 1: (40% + 42% + 50%)/3 = 44%
8For j = 1: (40% - 44%) + (42% - 44%) + (50% - 44%) = 0
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to be an unbiased estimate of the average effect of control ownership β1.
The IV2 Estimator – Correcting for Firm Heterogeneity
In order to contrast the relevance of both bias, we construct another instru-
ment X˜i proposed by Altonji and Shkotko‘s (1987), which only removes the
fixed firm specific error component µi, but keeps alive the assumed bias from
the firm-owner match-specific error term φij. This instrument uses the devi-
ation of the owner j’s block share at time t from the average control concen-
tration of firm i, in technical terms we have X˜i = Xijt−X¯i. By construction,
the expected value of X˜i is zero over the entire firm spell, and in turn un-
correlated with the fixed firm effect, hence Cov(µi, X˜i) = 0. However, this
instrument may still be correlated with the match effect (Cov(φij, X˜i) ̸= 0),
so that the IV2 estimator still produces the bias b1 in the estimated effect of
control concentration βIV 21 :
βIV 21 − β1 = b1. (7)
3.2.5 Prediction of Bias Direction and Relevance
Applying our identification procedure, we are now able to provide evidence
for the existence of the potential biases b1 and c1, and thus the relative
importance of firm and firm-owner match heterogeneity. To be more precise,
the different estimates of the effect of control ownership (βOLS1 , β
IV 1
1 , β
IV 2
1 )
allow us to draw inference on potential heterogeneity issues when estimating
the average effect of control concentration.
Please insert Table 1 approximately here
Table 1 provides an overview of possible scenarios of estimates with cor-
responding inference on the unobserved effects. It is evident that if we come
across alike estimates (row 2), we do not have to worry about any hetero-
geneity concerns. However, if we find βOLS1 > β
IV 2
1 > β
IV 1
1 , thus a twofold
upward biased OLS estimator, we can infer that both, the firm specific er-
ror (agent quality) µi as well as the match specific error φij (match quality)
89
are positively correlated with control ownership (row 3). If the opposite
holds true (row 4), thus if we have a negative correlation between owner-
ship concentration and both the heterogeneity sources, we will end up with
βOLS1 < β
IV 2
1 < β
IV 1
1 , which is a consistently downward biased OLS esti-
mator. Mixed heterogeneity effects are also conceivable; taking the most
commonly assumed case of fixed firm-effects with respect to control concen-
tration, thus c1 ̸= 0, but no firm-owner match bias (b1 = 0), we expect both
IV estimators to deliver equal results (βIV 11 = β
IV 2
1 ) while deviating from the
OLS estimate (row 6 and 7). Row 8 and 9 depict the case when both biases
are present but perfectly offset each other; then βOLS1 will be equal to β
IV 1
1 .
Both unobserved effects may additionally differ in direction and magnitude.
Once the fixed firm-bias c1 is stronger than the match bias b1, considering
solely firm heterogeneity (βIV 21 ) will still provide the right direction of the
overall bias, though overstate (row 10) or understate (row 12) the true aver-
age effect. However, following the conventional wisdom of purely controlling
for fixed firm effects might be strongly misleading once the match bias is
stronger and at odds with the fixed firm effect (row 11 and 13).
3.3 Data and Sample Description
3.3.1 Sample
The starting point of our study is a sample of all publicly CDAX-listed
firms in Germany observed in the course of 2000-2009. The ownership data
used in this study come from the ‘Who owns whom?’-database published
by Commerzbank. All financial data matched to the ownership data are
collected from Worldscope / Datastream. We exclude all financial firms
(SIC 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 4900-4949) from our sample as well as
those firms with missing or incomplete ownership and financial information,
ending up with a total sample size of 3255 firm-year observations comprising
475 different CDAX firms (see Table 2). We are able to identify and track all
unique controlling shareholders j by name and their corresponding control
stake in the company i in a precise way which allows us to determine the
duration of each firm-owner match ij and at the time control is transferred
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from one controlling party to another. This is done within and across the
commonly applied investor types that inherently suffers from non-negligible
imprecision of chosen categories. Our measure of control ownership refers to
voting rights at the direct ownership level.9
Please insert Table 2 approximately here
3.3.2 Summary Statistics
In accordance with other studies (e.g. Faccio and Lang, 2002), we find in
Table 2 strong evidence for a pronounced average ownership concentration of
around 46% in Germany with on average 3.1 years of control tenure for the
period observed (2000-2009). If we group the unique controlling investors
into broader categories of shareholder types, we find the degree of ownership
concentration to depend on the type of the largest owner with some differ-
ences in control tenure. Table 3 reports strategic owners – as one of the
major shareholder groups – to hold by far the largest average stake (64%)
as compared to state (49%), individual (43%) or financial investors (37%).
State (4.26 years) and individual (4 years) owners are recorded to have on av-
erage the longest control tenure (Villalonga and Amit, 2006), while financial
owners are the ones at the short end of control duration (3.33 years) as they
trade more frequently than other blockholders (Elyasiani and Jia, 2010).
Please insert Table 3 approximately here
In general and in line with Elyasiani and Jia (2010), we find a positive
relationship between average control concentration and length of the control
spell, as depicted in Table 4. One year of control is associated with a share
block of 41%, whereas three years with 48%, six years with 51% and nine
years with 57% of mean control concentration.
Please insert Table 4 approximately here
9However, it is to be noted that a major limitation of our data concerns the missing
IPO date and potential truncation with respect to firm-owner spells that started prior to
2000, and those that lasted longer than 2009.
91
However, this na¨ıve plotting is limited in telling us whether the average
controlling owner j with a long control spell in firm i comes in with a rela-
tively high share block, or whether he increases his stake over time in order
to defend his control position. To answer this question, we plot in Table
5 the development of ownership concentration by the recorded total control
tenure. Control concentration tends to be again greater the longer the total
control tenure while remaining at a high and constant level over the control
spell. This is quite in contrast to Donelli et al. (2013) who find controlling
shareholders in Chile to sell and purchase large ownership stakes with rela-
tively high frequency. With respect to our data, those owners observed to
be e.g. in control for in total three years hold a control stake of around 45%
over their entire control spell, whereas investors with a six year tenure come
in and maintain a control stake of around 51% – in all cases with only little
fluctuations over time. The tenure-concentration pattern suggests entering
blockholders to be aware of their own investment horizon, i.e. whether to
stay in control for a rather short or long while and to accordingly determine
the size of the initial control stake. The remaining question is now whether
those controlling owners who posses a comparably higher share block from
the beginning of control on – and who are at the same time more likely to
maintain control over a longer spell – produce better or worse match effects
than those owners with lower initial control ownership concentration and
short control tenure.
Please insert Table 5 approximately here
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration
This section aims at shedding light on the question to which extent – if
any – least square estimates of the effect of control concentration are biased
through firm and / or match heterogeneity. This in turn helps to explore if
good agent quality and good match quality firms are more likely to occur at
either high or low ownership concentration. Therefore, Table 6 reports the
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estimated marginal effect of control concentration (conc.) at certain concen-
tration levels (5% - 90%) for all three estimators introduced above (OLS,
IV1, IV2). All regression specifications account for non-linear effects of con-
trol concentration by including second degree polynomials; we also control
for observable firm characteristics, period and industry effects.
Please insert Table 6 approximately here
The OLS estimates in column 1 suggest a negative effect at the lower
end of ownership concentration (5% - 40%) which improves and then turns
positive (50% - 90%). For example, the effect of 10% of control concentration
on log Tobin’s Q is -0.0161, while the effect at 80% control is 0.0121.
Column 3 presents the corresponding results from estimations with in-
strumented control concentration by its deviations from the firm mean level
(IV2). Please recall that this estimator only eliminates the correlation with
the firm fixed effect µi, but not the potential bias from the correlation with
the fixed match effect φij. Though showing a similar pattern of changing
signs from negative to positive at a threshold level of around 40%, the IV2
estimates are lower than the OLS estimates at the lower control range (5
- 50%), and higher at high concentration levels (> 50%). This suggests
OLS estimates to be downward biased by firm heterogeneity at comparably
low ownership concentration; in other words, favorable agent quality is more
likely to occur at lower concentration levels, and consequently less often at
high levels. Again, the IV2 estimates do not account for possible match spe-
cific heterogeneity. If we now control for correlation of control concentration
with the match effect φij by applying our IV1 estimation approach, these
unbiased estimates suggest a declining positive effect over the entire range of
control concentration (10% control: 0.008, 40%: 0.005, 80%: 0.002). How-
ever, the positive effect falls increasingly below the OLS estimates at control
levels greater than 50%. To sum it up, the true effects of control ownership
estimated by IV1 are significantly higher at low concentration and reversely,
substantially lower at high concentration levels compared to biased OLS es-
timates. This is suggestive of favorable firm-owner matches to be more likely
at high control concentration, thus OLS to overstate the true effect of high
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concentration at the cost of relatively low control in the hands of the largest
investor. If contrasted to IV1, the overall upward bias in the OLS estimates
indirectly points towards the minor relevance of firm heterogeneity as the
IV2 estimates are even more upward (downward) biased than OLS at high
(low) concentration. Consequently, we infer mixed heterogeneity as of c < 0
(firm effect) and b ≫ 0 (match effect) at high ownership concentration and
c > 0 and b ≪ 0 at low concentration. This corresponds to case (13) and
(11) shown in Table 1, respectively.
3.4.2 Cumulative Effect of Ownership Concentration by Investor
Types
For robustness reasons, we run a similar analysis now only applying a broader
categorization of firm-owner matches. Table 7 displays the effect of control
concentration at various control levels by owner types as we assign each
unique owner to be either of a financial, individual, state or strategic type.
The results depicted in table 7 are obtained by splitting the sample into the
shareholder categories and by constructing the instruments (IV1 and IV2) –
as explained in section 2.4 – according to the assigned owner type instead of
using the unique owner information by names.
Please insert Table 7 approximately here
The results in Table 7 shown for OLS, IV1 and IV2 resemble the above
presented outcomes. Except for the small group of state owners, IV1 esti-
mates are rather similar across owner types and show higher control effects
at lower concentration and lower effects at high control concentration than
OLS and IV2, though IV1 estimates are mainly only significantly different
from zero for strategic owners due to only few observations by each investor
type. These results again confirm the prevalence of mixed heterogeneity with
the firm effect to be of minor importance and contrary to the match effect.
We therefore assume heterogenous match effects to induce in total an under-
statement of OLS estimates at low concentration levels, and conversely an
overstatement of the ownership effect at high concentration levels.
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3.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study provides novel evidence for least square estimates of the aver-
age effect of control concentration to suffer from substantial upward bias at
high concentration levels as they suggest a negative effect at comparably
low ownership concentration (≤ 40%) and a rather large positive effect at
high concentration levels (> 40%). In contrast, our unbiased IV estimates
– free from any unobserved heterogeneity – indicate control concentration in
Germany to have a positive effect at each concentration level, though at a
declining rate. This translates into a dominating positive monitoring effect of
ownership concentration over potential expropriation of minority owners no
matter the extent of control in the hand of the largest investor. Thus, man-
agement entrenchment costs – stemming from management’s rent-seeking
and empire building behavior (Jensen, 1986) – are effectively curbed by the
controlling owner to the benefit of all shareholders. The decline in the effect
of ownership concentration might be associated with the growing risk expo-
sure of the controlling owner’s undiversified wealth and thus an additional
compensation redeemed in private benefits (Admati et al., 1994).
Moreover, our econometric exercise provides some evidence for owner-
ship concentration to be positively correlated with unobserved firm-owner
match quality, this means that better matches are more likely to occur at
higher concentration levels. Rather surprisingly, the unobserved match effect
is found to be stronger and to work in the opposite direction than the bias
coming from firm heterogeneity. In other words, firms with favorable agent
quality are on average characterized by comparably low control concentra-
tion. We argue that both unobserved effects are partly interrelated, and
follow the argumentation by Burkart (1997) who suggests control concentra-
tion to restrain managerial effort and initiative by over-monitoring. In short,
good monitors may limit favorable management qualities. In consequence,
only correcting for fixed firm effects is strongly misleading as these estimates
even aggravate the overestimation (underestimation) bias of the true effect of
control concentration at high (low) levels. The bias from unobserved match
heterogeneity is found to be economically large.
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At the same time we observe controlling owners with a comparably large
stake in a firm – and who thus tend to produce value enhancing match
effects – to be more likely to survive in control. As the investors with long
control tenure are found to already enter control with a comparably high
stake, we infer that these investors non-randomly allocate into investment
duration by their predetermined ability and preferences towards monitoring
and expropriation. This interpretation extends the findings by Gaspar et
al. (2005) and Elyasiani and Jia (2010) who suggest long-term controlling
owners to be more able to reap the benefits from monitoring, and thus to
exert stronger efforts. All that is in line with the hypothesis of a patient and
committed large controlling owner (Bøhren et al., 2005).
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Tables
Table 1: Direction and relevance of bias stemming from firm and match heterogeneity.
Bias Sign of bias Direction and relevance of bias
(1) Consistent heterogeneity
(2) No bias b1 = 0, c1 = 0 β
OLS
1 = β
IV 2
1 = β
IV 1
1
(3) Upward bias b1 > 0, c1 > 0 β
OLS
1 > β
IV 2
1 > β
IV 1
1
(4) Downward bias b1 < 0, c1 < 0 β
IV 1
1 > β
IV 2
1 > β
OLS
1
(5) Mixed heterogeneity
(6) Upward bias b1 = 0, c1 > 0 β
OLS
1 > (β
IV 1
1 = β
IV 2
1 )
(7) Downward bias b1 = 0, c1 < 0 (β
IV 1
1 = β
IV 2
1 ) > β
OLS
1
(8) Offsetting effect b1 < 0, c1 > 0 (β
OLS
1 = β
IV 1
1 ) > β
IV 2
1
(9) Offsetting effect b1 > 0, c1 < 0 β
IV 2
1 > (β
OLS
1 = β
IV 1
1 )
(10) Upward bias b1 < 0, c1 ≫ 0 βOLS1 > βIV 11 > βIV 21
(11) Downward bias b1 ≪ 0, c1 > 0 βIV 11 > βOLS1 > βIV 21
(12) Downward bias b1 > 0, c1 ≪ 0 βIV 21 > βIV 11 > βOLS1
(13) Upward bias b1 ≫ 0, c1 < 0 βIV 21 > βOLS1 > βIV 11
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Table 2: Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Median Q75
Log Tobin’s Q 1.50 1.14 0.99 1.20 1.58
Percent control ownership 46.14 28.87 23.13 44.90 67.70
Log total assets 12.24 2.10 10.85 11.93 13.43
Ebit / sales 2.30 20.00 0.91 4.92 9.62
Leverage 33.07 27.10 6.99 31.25 52.57
Capex / sales 5.81 7.55 1.62 3.40 6.44
Sales growth 6.45 26.32 -5.32 3.62 13.88
Dummy firms paid dividends 55.21
Number of observations 3255
Number of firms 475
Number of firm-owner matches 1203
Av. duration firm-owner matches 3.01 2.23 1 2 4
Number of years 10
98
Table 3: Distribution of average control concentration (in %) and average
match duration (in years) over owner types (dispersed ownership (< 5%), financial
owner, individual owner, state owner, strategic owner).
Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Q50 Q75 N
Dispersed (< 5%)
Percent control ownership 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 129
Duration firm-owner match (yrs) 2.35 1.77 1.00 2.00 3.00 129
Financial owner (≥ 5%)
Percent control ownership 37.41 28.39 11.90 27.40 55.20 778
Duration firm-owner match (yrs) 3.33 2.31 1.00 3.00 5.00 778
Individual owner (≥ 5%)
Percent control ownership 42.73 23.64 24.75 39.94 56.00 1319
Duration firm-owner match (yrs) 4.00 2.64 2.00 3.00 6.00 1319
State owner (≥ 5%)
Percent control ownership 49.19 32.70 22.10 45.00 93.30 135
Duration firm-owner match (yrs) 4.26 2.79 2.00 4.00 6.00 135
Strategic owner (≥ 5%)
Percent control ownership 64.21 28.98 40.91 66.28 93.91 1470
Duration firm-owner match (yrs) 3.84 2.55 2.00 3.00 6.00 1470
Table 4: Distribution of average control concentration (in %) over firm-owner
match duration (in years). Please note that this presentation scheme features multiple
counting of firm-owner matches, e.g. controlling owners found to be in control for in total
8 years are also considered in preceding years (years 1-7).
Mean Std. Dev. Q25 Median Q75 N
Year 1 41.09 29.89 15.43 32.00 63.70 1061
Year 2 45.12 29.41 20.56 40.51 66.00 718
Year 3 48.38 28.80 25.00 49.00 70.00 442
Year 4 48.86 27.41 25.56 50.00 68.13 318
Year 5 50.23 27.15 28.00 50.00 70.58 225
Year 6 51.07 26.77 30.00 50.09 72.70 174
Year 7 52.39 25.37 32.03 50.10 74.10 127
Year 8 54.20 24.59 36.58 51.38 74.66 91
Year 9 56.69 25.15 37.00 53.55 76.00 58
Year 10 54.47 22.10 37.49 51.35 70.00 41
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Table 5: Development of average control concentration (in %) by total ob-
served firm-owner match duration (in years).
Duration Yr 1 Yr 2 Yr 3 Yr 4 Yr 5 Yr 6 Yr 7 Yr 8 Yr 9 Yr 10 Obs
1 34.05 401
2 42.03 42.05 315
3 44.56 44.23 45.30 139
4 48.65 49.12 51.14 52.04 108
5 48.08 49.04 47.96 47.49 47.78 61
6 50.83 51.99 52.10 51.78 51.61 51.25 58
7 43.05 44.44 46.61 46.87 47.68 47.58 45.08 43
8 52.04 54.13 55.83 57.99 56.57 54.83 55.20 54.76 38
9 58.62 59.17 60.11 60.77 63.08 58.17 57.58 57.78 57.75 17
10 64.11 63.31 65.46 63.59 64.04 63.99 62.47 62.25 62.24 59.91 54
100
Table 6: Cumulative effect of control concentration (conc.) on Tobin’s Q
evaluated at different control concentration levels – OLS and IV. The cumulative
marginal effect of control concentration at a particular concentration level is computed as
the linear combination of the polynomial coefficients of the form (k, k2). IV1 is control
concentration instrumented with its deviations from the owner-firm match means. IV2
is control concentration instrumented with its deviations from the firm means. Please
note that only the second stage of the IV estimations are depicted in the table. Control
variables included are firm size, leverage, EBIT/sales, cash/ta, sales growth and a dummy
indicating payout of cash dividends (see Appendix for definitions). We further control for
period and industry effects (FF12). Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered on
firm level. Small sample statistics are applied on our IV regressions. Statistical significance
levels are reported at *** p<0.01, **p< 0.05, * p<0.10.
OLS IV1 IV2
Variable 1 2 3
5 % conc. -0.0135*** 0.0084 -0.0212***
(0.0050) (0.0065) (0.0071)
10 % conc. -0.0118*** 0.0079 -0.0187***
(0.0045) (0.0059) (0.0064)
20 % conc. -0.0084** 0.0070 -0.0139***
(0.0034) (0.0048) (0.0048)
30 % conc. -0.0050** 0.0061* -0.0090***
(0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0034)
40 % conc. -0.0016 0.0052* -0.0041*
(0.0017) (0.0027) (0.0023)
50 % conc. 0.0019 0.0043** 0.0008
(0.0016) (0.0021) (0.0020)
60 % conc. 0.0053** 0.0034* 0.0056**
(0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0028)
70 % conc. 0.0087*** 0.0025 0.0105**
(0.0032) (0.0027) (0.0041)
80 % conc. 0.0121*** 0.0016 0.0154***
(0.0042) (0.0037) (0.0056)
90 % conc. 0.0155*** 0.0007 0.0202***
(0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0072)
Obs. 3255 3255 3255
R2 0.1107 0.0849 0.1075
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4.1 Introduction
In the past 20 years, the valuation of multi-segment firms has been subject to
countless studies that produced very mixed evidence. Early papers show that
diversified firms trade at a significant premium in comparison to a matched
portfolio of standalone peers (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Berger and Ofek, 1995;
Servaes, 1996). Even some recent studies confirm this discount (e.g. Amman
et al., 2012; Hoechle et al., 2012). Apart from those studies discussing the
reasons of the observed discount (e.g. Stein, 1997; Rajan et al., 2000; Mat-
suaka and Nanda, 2002) as well as the potential distortions caused by mea-
surement problems (Mansi and Reeb, 2002; Villalonga, 2004a), questions on
the appropriate estimation methodology of the effect of diversification have
been increasingly raised. Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004b)
are the first who doubted the presumed random nature of firms’ selection into
corporate diversification. Their results suggest that diversification does not
destroy value on average but even leads to a premium as already discounted
firms are more likely to diversify. In an attempt to recover the average causal
effect of diversification, various estimators have been proposed to overcome
the presumably endogenous selection decision. Primarily, Heckman’s (1979)
self-selection correction model is applied which, however, provides a limited
perspective on the average causal effects of diversification as a homogenous
diversification effect is implicitly assumed. Alternative approaches proposed
by the literature – as instrumental variable (IV) estimation or propensity
score matching – are found to be rather unlikely to identify the requested
average diversification effect.1
As a novelty in the conglomerate literature, this study makes use of en-
dogenous switching regressions (Maddala, 1983) offering the advantage of
identifying heterogeneous diversification effects as diversified and focussed
firms may benefit differently from the corporate diversification decision. In
1Imbens and Angrist (1994) find that the IV estimator is unlikely to identify the average
treatment effect (△ATE) in the presence of heterogenous average effects. They suggest IV
to rather identify the local average treatment effect (LATE). As e.g. Blundell and Dias
(2009) point out, matching estimators do account for the differences in the composition of
observable characteristics across firm types but do not control for selection on unobservable
firm characteristics.
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order to test for a potential heterogeneity in causal effects, we calculate the
three most common treatment parameters:2 (1.) The average causal effect
if firms were assigned at random to diversification (△ATE), (2.) the average
effect on those firms that self-selected into diversification (△ATT ), and (3.)
the average diversification effect on the non-diversifying firms (△ATU).3 At
the same time, this approach allows to account for composition effects (se-
lection on observables) across firm types as diversified and standalone firms
may also differ in their average firm characteristics affecting the observed
firm value. Another major advancement offered by switching regressions is
to learn about the underlying selection regime, i.e. to answer why firms
self-select into a certain firm type.
We apply our analysis on a sample of 51,878 firm-years recorded from 1992
to 2012 in the US-market. Although we observe a conglomerate discount in
the market, our results suggest diversification itself to be beneficial for all
firms; for a random firm, for firms decided to diversify, and even for firms
chosen to stay focussed. Latter finding – which appears counter-intuitive at
the first glance – becomes sensible when considering the prevailing selection
regime: We find evidence for a selection on expected gains. In this light,
only self-selected firms expect sufficiently large benefits exceeding the corre-
sponding costs of diversification. Furthermore, firms chosen to diversify are
confirmed to be of a negative selection quality (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002)
as well as possessing a less favorable composition of firm characteristics. This
is suggested to be the reason for the observed diversification discount which
should not be mistaken for a negative effect of diversification itself.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the methodology
used to identify the gains from diversification which is followed by our identi-
fication strategy on the selection quality and the selection regime. Our data
and descriptive statistics are presented in section 4. Section 5 presents and
2For an intensive discussion on the variety of treatment parameters, please see Blundell
and Dias (2009).
3Villalonga (2004b) and Li and Prabhala (2007) suggest the estimated effect from
Heckman’s (1979) self-selection correction model to represent the average diversification
effect of those firms that diversified (△ATT ). This is not the case as it only recovers the
average diversification effect of a random firm (△ATE).
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discusses the results of our estimation exercise. Part 6 feeds our results into
the existing literature and concludes.
4.2 Modelling gains from diversification
Conventional approach
Starting off with the conventional approach, equation (1) describes the re-
gression model commonly employed to evaluate the benefits of diversification
Vit = X
′
itβ + δDit + uit (1)
where Vit denotes the excess value of firm i at time t, Xit a vector of exoge-
nous firm characteristics, uit a stochastic component reflecting unobserved
firm productivity and Dit a dummy variable with Dit = 1 if the firm decides
to diversify, and Dit = 0 otherwise. In this pooled sample model, the effect
of diversification is measured by δ. However, as found by Campa and Kedia
(2002), the dummy variable Dit cannot be treated as exogenous – resulting
in inconsistent and biased estimates of δ – once the decision to diversify is
driven by self-selection. This usually calls for the application of Heckman’s
(1979) selection model to overcome the distortions from self-selectivity.
However, the conventional approach does not allow for a differentiated
view on the average effects of diversification. Even though the average effect
of diversification for a random firm (△ATE) can be estimated, it does not
recover the average impact effect conditional on the realized firm type (△ATT ,
△ATU). This is where endogenous switching regressions come into play. In
the subsequent sections, we demonstrate how the various parameter estimates
of the switching regression can be used for calculating expected firm values
and gains from diversification while considering selection on observable and
unobservable firm characteristics.
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4.2.1 Potential outcomes and switching regressions
Endogenous switching regression
Although sharing the basic notion with Heckman’s (1979) selection model,
we rest our study on a more general model of potential outcomes (Quandt,
1972; Rubin, 1978) that explicitly attributes the selection process to a cer-
tain outcome equation, called ‘endogenous switching regressions’ (Lee, 1978;
Maddala, 1983):
V1it = X
′
1itβ1 + u1it if Dit = 1 (2)
V0it = X
′
0itβ0 + u0it if Dit = 0 (3)
In words, the decision in favor of a certain firm type j corresponds to
a particular excess value equation. The decision to diversify (Dit = 1 or
j = 1) is linked to the outcome equation (2), otherwise (3)4. In contrast to
the pooled sample model (1), equations (2) and (3) account for differences
in the average firm characteristics across firm types, thus allows for X1it ̸=
X0it. Though either V1it or V0it is observed for any firm, one would like to
recover both outcomes – the realized one as well as the hypothetical one
in the so called ‘counterfactual’ state – in order to derive the effect (also
called ‘gains’) of diversification, which simply is △ = V1it − V0it. However,
this is part of subsequent econometric exercise. By now, we suggest an
underlying threshold model to reflect the decision process with net benefits
of diversification D∗it to determine the final decision Dit.
Dit = 1 if D
∗
it ≡ Z ′itθ + ηit ≥ 0 (4)
Dit = 0 if D
∗
it ≡ Z ′itθ + ηit < 0
Whether the net benefits of diversification are non-negative (D∗it ≥ 0),
and thus the firm decides to diversify (Dit = 1), depends on the exogenous
4For Dit = 0 or j = 0.
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factors subsumed in vector Zit and the error term ηit.
5
Moreover, our switching model assumes a joint normality distribution be-
tween the errors of the excess value equations ((2) and (3)) and the selection
equation (4) with zero means and a variance-covariance matrix as of
Σ =
 σ
2
η = 1 σ1η σ0η
σ1η σ
2
1 .
σ0η . σ
2
0

such that (ηit, u1it, u0it) ∼ N (0, Σ). The variance of the selection equa-
tion is denoted by σ2η and can be normalized to 1; σ
2
1 and σ
2
0 are the error
variances of the excess value equations (2) and (3). Further, the off-diagonals
represent the covariance between the error terms of the outcome and selection
equations while ρjησj = σjη applies.
6 To give abstract expressions names, uj
reflects unobservable firm value drivers with variance σ2j ; ηj covers unobserv-
able determinants affecting the diversification decision with unity variance
(σ2η). Consequently, σjη indicates whether, and how, the unobserved value
drivers and unobserved choice determinants are correlated.
Source of selection bias
Key of the self-selection problem is that a non-zero covariance between errors
causes the violation of the conditional zero mean error assumption in the
excess value equations, i.e. E(ujit | Xj, D) ̸= 0, and thus leads to an over- or
underestimation of the true average effect of diversification (β1 − β0). This
is what we call the ‘selection bias’. For this reason, a major concern in the
diversification literature is with testing whether σ1η = 0 and σ0η = 0.
7
In order to test – and when necessary to control – for selectivity in empir-
5Zit suffices the exclusion restriction by containing exogenous variables not included
in Xit. The unobserved benefit ηit of diversification is also sometimes referred as ‘private
information’ underlying a firm’s choice to diversify that may be positively or negatively
correlated with firm value (Li and Prabhala, 2007).
6As only one outcome is possible to occur, the covariance between the two potential
outcomes remains undefined.
7In the conventional approach (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002) with pooled sample we
test whether σ1η = 0.
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ical practice, the selection bias is suggested (Maddala, 1983) to be modelled
by
E[u1it | X1it, Dit = 1] = σ1η φ(Z
′
itθ)
Φ(Z ′itθ)
= σ1ηλ1it (5)
for the excess value equation of diversified firms (2) and accordingly for
the excess value equation of standalone firms (3):
E[u0it | X0it, Dit = 0] = −σ0η φ(Z
′
itθ)
1− Φ(Z ′itθ)
= σ0ηλ0it (6)
with λ1it =
φ(Z′itθ)
Φ(Z′itθ)
> 0 and λ0it =
−φ(Z′itθ)
1−Φ(Z′itθ) < 0, where φ(Z
′
itθ) denotes
the standardized probability density function and Φ(Z ′itθ) the corresponding
cumulative distribution function of the normally distributed selection error ηit
evaluated at non-random Z ′itθ. To be more clear on this technical expression,
the selection terms λ1it and λ0it, also called inverse Mills ratios, control for the
truncation of the selection error ηit caused by the selection criteria in equation
(4). For diversified firms, this is λ1(Z
′
itθ) = E(ηit | ηit > −Z ′itθ). In words, the
selection error ηit is on average above zero for low values of Zit, and otherwise
rather normally distributed, such that we have a negative correlation between
the unobservable ηit and observable Zit choice determinants, though this
is not the case for the population. Once the errors are correlated (σ1η ̸=
0), the error u1it of the outcome equation will start to correlate with the
observable value drivers X1it as X1it is a strict subset of the observable choice
determinants Zit (and Zit is correlated with ηit). Thus, the zero error mean
assumption is violated and we receive biased parameter estimates for the
excess value equation (2). Analogously, for firms chosen to stay focused,
λ0(Z
′
itθ) = E(ηit | ηit < −Z ′itθ), the negative truncation of ηit is pronounced
for high values of Zit and converges to zero from below at low values of Zit,
thus ηit is also negatively correlated with Zit. To conclude, the truncation
of ηit is always positive for diversified firms, hence λ1it > 0, while it is the
opposite case for firms chosen not to diversify (λ0it < 0).
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Estimation of endogenous switching regressions
Given above assumptions and derivations of the error distribution, the pa-
rameters of the selection (θ) and the excess value equations (βj, σjη) are si-
multaneously estimated by full information maximum likelihood estimation
(FIML) by maximizing the log likelihood function, which is the probability
of the joint outcome of the observed firm value and the underlying selection
decision, i.e. Pr(V1it, D
∗
it ≥ 0 | X,Z) and Pr(V0it, D∗it < 0 | X,Z).8
4.2.2 Expected firm values and selection bias
In a next step, we use the parameter estimates from the switching regressions
above for linear predictions of excess values for each firm type unconditional
and conditional upon observed and unobserved factors influencing the diver-
sification decision (Table 1).
Unbiased expected firm values
First of all, we calculate both the expected excess value of a firm with average
firm characteristics (X) if randomly entered a) diversification
a) E(V1it | X) = X ′itβ1
as well as if b) the same firm was randomly assigned to stay focused
b) E(V0it | X) = X ′itβ0.
8We base our estimations of the endogenous switching regressions on the user-written
STATA command movestay (Lokshin and Sajaia, 2004). Apart from estimating selection
models by full information maximum likelihood (FIML) - as done by movestay -, selection
models can also be estimated by the two-step method (LIML) suggested by Heckman
(1979). This estimation method, where the selection decision is estimation by probit
(ML) and the selectivity adjusted outcome equation by OLS, is usually employed in the
diversification literature (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002). The two-step method requires
less stringent assumptions on the variance-covariance, but is less efficient than LIML. See
Puhani (2000) for discussion.
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Expected firm values biased by selection on observables
Further, we calculate the expected firm value for each firm type for a ran-
domly chosen firm that has the average observable firm characteristics of
firms observed to chosen diversification (X1).
a1) E(V1it | X1) = X ′1itβ1
b1) E(V0it | X1) = X ′1itβ0.
In case the average diversified firm has the same characteristics X1 as an
average firm in the overall population X, the expected firm values in each
firm type will be alike: a) = a1) and b) = b1). Hence, we can rule out
selection on observables. However, as we will see later in our analysis, this is
unlikely to occur in reality. The same rationale applies when calculating both
the expected values in diversification and non-diversification for a randomly
chosen firm now endowed with the average characteristics of firms chosen to
stay focused (X0):
a0) E(V1it | X0) = X ′0itβ1
b0) E(V0it | X0) = X ′0itβ0
Expected firm values biased by selection on observables and selec-
tion on unobservables
Beyond that, we are able to compute the actual expected firm values of c)
firms decided to diversify having respective observed X1 and unobserved λ1
firm characteristics:
c) E(V1it | X1, D = 1) = X ′1itβ1 + σ1ηλ1it
as well as d) the expected outcome for the counterfactual case that these
diversified firms did not diversify:
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d) E(V0it | X1, D = 1) = X ′1itβ0 + σ0ηλ1it.
The counterfactual d) is calculated as the hypothetical expected value
given the average observedX1 and unobserved λ1 characteristics of diversified
firms if they were in the non-diversification state, i.e. as they were having
the coefficients of standalones on observable (β0) and unobservable (σ0η)
characteristics.
Analogously, we compute the e) actual and f) counterfactual expected
values of standalones.
e) E(V0it | X0, D = 0) = X ′0itβ0 + σ0ηλ0it
f) E(V1it | X0, D = 0) = X ′0itβ1 + σ1ηλ0it
[Please insert Table 1 approximately here.]
4.2.3 Diversification gains and selection bias
As presented in Table 1, having once computed the various expected firm val-
ues, we are able to derive the gains from diversification considering selection
on observable and unobservable characteristics.
Unbiased diversification gains
First, we determine the ‘true’ average effect of diversification which is the firm
value differential of a random firm (with population average characteristics
X) that is simultaneously assigned to enter a) the diversification state as well
as b) to staying a single-segment firm △ATE:
a)− b) △ATE | X = E(V1it − V0it | X) (7)
= X ′it(β1 − β0)
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which is equivalent to recovering the undistorted estimate of δ in the
conventional estimation practice as in equation (1), i.e. △ATE = δDit. By
definition, diversification gains require a value creating effect of diversifica-
tion, hence X ′it(β1 − β0) > 0, which we assume for the analytical derivation
of our analysis.9 This is the effect recovered by Campa and Kedia (2002)
and Villalonga (2004b).
Diversification gains biased by selection on observables
Furthermore, the gains from diversification can be computed as the difference
in the expected firm value between both possible firm types given a random
firm which has the average characteristics of diversified firms X1:
a1)− b1) △ATE | X1 = E(V1it − V0it | X1) (8)
= X ′1it(β1 − β0)
as well as given the random firm has in both possible states the average
characteristics of standalones X1:
a0)− b0) △ATE | X0 = E(V1it − V0it | X0) (9)
= X ′0it(β1 − β0).
These variants of ‘gains’ so far tell us whether we have a favorable or
unfavorable composition of average observable characteristics (selection on
observables) of diversified firms (X1) compared to the overall population (X)
as well as in contrast to standalones (X0).
9Accordingly, X ′it(β1−β0) < 0 would imply a value destructing effect of diversification,
i.e. a ‘diversification loss’.
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Diversification gains biased by selection on observables and selec-
tion on unobservables
Simply comparing the actual average firm values of those firms deliberately
decided to diversify c) and those chosen to stay focused e) yields a measure
of diversification gains which is distorted by observable composition as well
as unobservable self-selection effects:
c)− e) △ = E(V1it | X1, D = 1)− E(V0it | X0, D = 0) (10)
= (X ′1itβ1 + σ1ηλ1it)− (X ′0itβ0 + σ0ηλ0it)
= (X ′1itβ1 −X ′0itβ0) + (σ1ηλ1it − σ0ηλ0it).
This strongly distorted effect has been identified in the original work
by Berger and Ofek (1995). However, we are interested in the benefits of
diversification for firms eventually chosen to diversify, which is the difference
between the realized expected value c) and the hypothetical expected value
in non-diversification d):
c)− d) △ATT | X1 = E(V1it | X1, D = 1)− E(V0it | X1, D = 1)
= X ′1it(β1 − β0) + (σ1η − σ0η)λ1it. (11)
Accordingly, we may ask whether standalone firms would be better off if
they chose diversification:
f)− e) △ATU | X0 = E(V1it | X0, Dit = 0)− E(V0it | X0it, Dit = 0)
= X ′0it(β1 − β0) + (σ1η − σ0η)λ0it. (12)
4.3 Modelling selection into diversification
In order to discuss the arguably non-random selection into diversification,
we introduce and challenge two major selection frameworks with the help
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of the different conditional and conditional expected firm values and diver-
sification gains we derived from the endogenous switching regressions. Both
frameworks have in common that they consider the unobservable selection
quality, which is whether firms chosen to diversify are a random, a positive
or a negative selection or whether they enjoy an absolute advantage in the
firm type they finally selected into. However, these two frameworks differ in
their selection regime, which is the mechanism that eventually makes firms
to self-select into a certain firm type. First, the Roy (1951) model suggests
firms to self-select into the the firm type that promises the highest expected
firm value. Alternatively, the ‘selection on expected gains’-regime predicts
firms to self-select once they find the expected benefits of diversification to
exceed the corresponding costs of diversification (e.g. Heckman et al., 2001;
Blundell and Dias, 2009). Both selection regimes may but do not need to
contradict each other.
4.3.1 Selection according to highest expected firm value
Based on Roy’s (1951) two sector choice model, a firm is argued to be able
to anticipate its potential firm value in both available firm types and eventu-
ally selects into the one that provides the highest expected firm value, thus
E(Vit) = max E(V1it). Table 2 lines out the conditional expected firm val-
ues for all possible selection qualities, namely no selection bias (column 2),
non-hierarchical sorting / absolute advantage (column 3), and hierarchical
sorting. The latter can be divided into positive (column 4) and negative
(column 5) selection quality. This approach solely relies on the sign of the
covariances of the error terms, i.e. whether σjη > 0 or σjη < 0.
[Please insert Table 2 approximately here.]
 Case 1. No selection bias: σ0η = 0 / σ1η = 0. Those firms that
decide to diversify c) yield the same expected firm value as a random
firm with the same average characteristics a1). Accordingly, firms cho-
sen to stay focused e) have the same expected value as a comparable
random firm b0). The same is true for the respective counterfactual
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value. In consequence, there is no reason to deliberately self-select on
unobservable factors.
 Case 2. Non-hierarchical sorting / absolute advantage: σ0η < 0
/ σ1η > 0. In the non-hierarchical case, each firm realizes its compara-
tive advantage in the firm type it selected into; those firms selected into
diversification c) expect a higher firm value than a comparable random
firm, but are worse than average in the counterfactual state d). Conse-
quently, diversification will produce greater benefits under self-selection
than under a random assignment. Accordingly, those firms that are fo-
cused e) are better than an average firm with same characteristics, but
worse than a random firm in case it decided to diversify f).
 Case 3.1 Positive selection: σ0η > 0 / σ1η > 0. In this case, firms
that diversify are superior against an comparable random firm in either
firm type due to their high unobservable productivity levels. However,
the diversification state still provides a higher expected value which
eventually makes them self-select into D = 1. At the same time, stan-
dalone firms are expected to be worse than a comparable random firm
in each firm type, but are still better valuated by the market if selected
into D = 0.
 Case 3.2 Negative selection: σ0η < 0 / σ1η < 0: This is the reverse
case of 3.1; diversified firms are worse (discounted) compared to a com-
parable random firm in each firm type due to their lower unobserved
productivity. However, they realize their comparative advantage when
selecting into diversification as their discount is then at least reduced.
Negative self-selection has been commonly diagnosed in prior diver-
sification studies; Campa and Kedia (2002) therefore conclude that
discounted firms are more likely to diversify. In turn, focussed firms
are in this case the superior firms with higher unobserved productivity
and thus enjoy a premium compared to a comparable average firm.
 Case 4. Non-plausible / destructive selection σ0η > 0 / σ1η < 0: Firms
would each select into the firm type that makes them worse than a
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comparable random firm.
4.3.2 Selection on expected gains
Alternatively, the treatment effects literature (e.g. Heckman et al., 2001;
Blundell and Dias, 2009) proposes – in the presence of heterogenous diversi-
fication effects – that firms self-select according to their expected gains from
diversification. Following Blundell and Dias (2009), firms deliberately self-
select into diversification whenever the expected gains from diversification
exceed the respective costs. As the costs of diversification are suggested to
be measured by the selection equation (4), the following condition has to
hold for firms to decide to diversify:
E(V1it | Xj, D = j)− E(V0it | Xj, D = j) ≥ Z ′itθ + ηit. (13)
As a random firm is assumed to be indifferent in the diversification deci-
sion, we imply that firms deliberately choose to diversify (j = 1) once their
expected gains from diversification exceed the gains of a comparable random
firm, thus if △ATT > △ATE | X1. In turn, focussed firms (j = 0) do not
choose to diversify – though they may have a higher expected firm value
in diversification – whenever △ATU < △ATE | X0 holds. Summing up, the
basic notion of this selection regime implies that rational firms require at
least the average gain of a comparable random firm; otherwise they refrain
from choosing diversification as the downward risk of a potential loss is too
high. Apart from the sign of the covariances of the error terms (σ1η, σ0η),
this approach also considers their magnitude relative to each other (Maddala,
1983). In detail:
 Case 1. No selection bias: σ1η − σ0η = 0. In this case, we have a
random selection into firm types as △ATT = △ATE | X1 and △ATU =
△ATE | X0.
 Case 2. σ1η − σ0η > 0. In this case, we have △ATT > △ATE | X1 and
△ATU < △ATE | X0. Firms select according to their expected gains
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which are above average given the same characteristics X1. In turn,
focussed firms do not choose to diversify once their gains are below
the gains of a comparable random firm. This applies for each selection
quality :
Case 2.1 : Hierarchical sorting / absolute advantage implies that
σ1η > 0 and σ0η < 0 which leads to △ATT > △ATE | X1 and
△ATU < △ATE | X0;
Case 2.2 : Positive selection implies that σ1η ≫ 0 and σ0η > 0
which leads to △ATT > △ATE | X1 and △ATU < △ATE | X0;
Case 2.3 : Negative selection implies that σ1η < 0 and σ0η ≪ 0
which leads to △ATT > △ATE | X1 and △ATU < △ATE | X0.
 Case 3. σ1η − σ0η < 0. This is the reverse of Case 2. Irrationally,
those firms with below average gains, i.e. those firms that face costs
of diversification to be higher than the corresponding benefits, would
non-randomly select into diversification.
4.4 Sample selection and descriptives
4.4.1 Sample selection and excess value measure
We obtain a sample of publicly traded US-firms over the 21-year period from
1992 to 2012 from the Thomson Reuters Datastream/Worldscope database.
Following previous studies (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995), we exclude firm
years with at least one reported segment in the financial sector (SIC 6000-
6999) and with insufficient financial information on segments with respect to
sales figures and industry affiliation. We further eliminate all observations
with deficient sales figures concerning negative total or segment sales, total
sales of zero, and whenever the sum of segment sales is different from total
firm sales by more than 1%. Segments reported as ‘non-classified establish-
ments’ (SIC 9900-9999) are not regarded as business segments. In order to
avoid distorted valuation multipliers, we remove firms with total sales below
20 million USD since small firms usually trade at a discount due to a low
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market liquidity (see e.g. Loderer and Roth, 2005). These procedures leave
us with a final sample of 7,051 firms with a total of 51,878 firm years.
For identifying firms as standalone or diversified, we focus in our analysis
on unrelated diversification which is measured at the two-digit SIC code level.
This classification allows us to analyze conglomerization taking advantage
of the co-insurance effect as industries on two-digit SIC code level are by
definition non-perfectly correlated (e.g. Lewellen, 1971; Leland, 2007). Firms
are classified as diversified if they report sales in two or more segments, with
the most important segment accounting for less than 90% of total sales.
Correspondingly, firms are classified as standalone if they report sales in only
one segment or if the biggest segment accounts for more than 90% of total
sales. This procedure avoids the classification of firms as being diversified,
even though their operational focus lies on one segment with only negligible
operations in others.
We compute excess values for both diversified and standalone firms in
each year as the natural logarithm of the ratio between a firm’s actual value to
its imputed value. A firm’s imputed value is defined as the sum of its imputed
segment sales, where a segment’s imputed value is calculated by multiplying
its sales with the median firm value-to-sales ratio of all standalone firms
operating in the same two-digit SIC industry in a certain year. In this respect,
we require at least five benchmark firms in the same industry in order to
calculate a valid imputed value. In line with prior research, we account for
extreme outliers by excluding observations with imputed values greater than
five or less than one-fifth of the actual value. We focus in our analysis on
sales-to-value multipliers due to the poor data coverage of assets and earnings
on segment levels provided by the Worldscope database.
[Please insert Table 3 approximately here.]
Table 3 reports the distribution of firm types along with the correspond-
ing excess values over time. Out of the total of 51,878 firm years, 44,498
(86%) are standalone firms, whereas 7,380 (14%) are recorded as diversified.
However, the distribution of firm types fluctuates over the years with a higher
fraction of multi-segment years in the early years (1992 / 1993: 19%) and a
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lower percentage in the late years of our panel (2011: 11%; 2012: 13%). In
comparison to other studies (e.g. Berger and Ofek, 1995, Campa and Kedia,
2002, or Amman et al. (2012)) our portion of diversified firms is smaller.
However, it is in line with studies relying on newer datasets and perform-
ing an equivalent elimination of non-classifiable segments (SIC 9900 - 9999)
(e.g. Rudolph and Schwetzler, 2014). Equivalent to other studies (see e.g.
Berger and Ofek (1995), Ammann et al., 2012), a negative excess value for
diversified firms is recorded with an overall mean (median) of -0.096 (-0.088)
indicating a diversification discount for US conglomerates. Though changing
over time, the discount of diversified firms remains significant for most of
the years. The strong exceptions of very narrowed excess values in 1997 and
1998 may be partly attributed to the distortions caused by the introduction
of the new segment-reporting standard (SFAS 131) that fell in this period.
Further, the pronounced decline in the discount reported during economic
and financial crisis (2001, 2008) is argued to stem from the internal capital
markets of diversified firms that unfold their benefits during times of lacking
funding from external sources (Rudolph and Schwetzler, 2014).
4.4.2 Distribution of firm characteristics
In our empirical analysis we use a reduced as well as an extended set of
control variables. The reduced set includes those explanatory variables most
commonly used in conglomerate discount studies featuring a broad data cov-
erage: firm size measured as logarithm of total assets, leverage defined as
long-term debt divided by total assets, EBIT to sales reflecting profitability,
capital expenditures to sales as an indication for investment activity, as well
as the liquidity proxy cash- and short-term investments to total assets. Our
extended set of control variables, which we apply for robustness reasons, re-
sembles the one used by Campa and Kedia (2002) additionally comprising
the squared log of total assets, the first (1 lag) and second lag (2 lag) of firm
size, EBIT to sales, and capex to sales. Beyond that, we include a dummy
variable indicating a firm’s dividend payout (Villalonga, 2004b), majorix list-
ing in at least one of the major indexes such as Dow Jones GLOBAL, Dow
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Jones COMPOSITE, FTSE WORLD, FTSE ALL, S&P 500 (e.g. Campa
and Kedia (2002), Villalonga (2004b)).
In order to meet the exclusion restriction necessary to identify the out-
come equations of the endogenous switching regressions10 as well as of our
instrumental variable (IV) estimation, we are required to find one or more
exogenous variables that are uncorrelated with firm value but influence the
decision to diversify. In this respect, we follow Campa and Kedia (2002) who
suggest the fraction of diversified firms in the major industry segment (PN-
DIV ) and the respective fraction of industry sales accounted for by diversified
firms (PSDIV ) to meet the requirements of an appropriate instrument. We
additionally include a dummy indicating whether a firm reports any minority
interests, which is suggested by Kuppuswamy et al. (2012).
[Please insert Table 4 approximately here.]
The distribution of firm characteristics shown in Table 4 already suggests
the sub-samples of diversified and focused firms not to constitute a random
subset of the overall sample. In particular, diversified firms are larger, have a
higher profitability and leverage, as well as a significantly greater likelihood
to pay dividends, whereas standalones have on average a higher investment
ratio and hold more cash and cash equivalents. These findings are in line with
the common literature (Duchin, 2010; Subramaniam et al., 2010; Rudolph
and Schwetzler, 2014). However, please note that this composition effect is
not the major problem of the ‘selection bias’ as this on its own does not bias
the parameter estimation of the excess valuation equations (2) and (3).
4.5 Results
4.5.1 OLS and IV estimation
Acting as reference points, Table 5 and 6 provide the estimated effects of
diversification by least squares (column 1) and instrumental variable (IV)
10The excess value equations (2) and (3) are already identified by the non-linearity of the
inverse Mills ratios added. However, we still include the suggested instrumental variables
in order to avoid collinearity problems as the inverse Mills ratio has quasi-linear traits
(Puhani, 2000).
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regressions (column 2). For both models, we use the conventional pooled
sample approach regressing the excess value on a diversification dummy and
a set of control variables. Please recall that ordinary OLS does not control
for a potentially endogenous diversification decision while the IV estimator is
supposed to retrieve the average diversification effect of a random firm. The
results of the OLS estimation employing the reduced set of controls (Table
5) suggest a statistically and economically significant diversification discount
of -0.088, which is in line with the literature as e.g. Campa and Kedia (2002)
report a discount of -0.11. As suggested by the same literature, the effect of
diversification turns positive when controlling for endogenous selection. The
IV estimation suggests a fairly high and significant premium of 0.189 for a
random firm with sample average characteristics. As shown in Table 6, these
results are fully confirmed even when using the extended set of controls.
[Please insert Table 5 approximately here.]
[Please insert Table 6 approximately here.]
4.5.2 Endogenous switching regressions
Parameter estimates of diversification decision and excess value
equations
Diversification decision
Column (3) in Table 5 shows the estimated parameters of the selection equa-
tion (4). The results suggest firm size to be the major observable driver
of the diversification decision, whereas high investment activities and cash
holdings reduce the likelihood of being observed as conglomerate. A high
fraction of diversified firms in the same industry as well as minority interests
further trigger diversification. The extended model in Table 6 additionally
reveals that dividend payments to the shareholders and listing in one of major
indices explain the diversification decision.
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Excess value equations
The unbiased estimates of β1 and β0 of the excess value equations (2) and
(3) are presented in columns (4) and (5) of Table 5, respectively. Although
each explanatory variable is estimated to have more or less the same impact
(sign) on firm value, it becomes already apparent that the effect (magnitude)
of each input factor varies over the two firm types. These differences in coef-
ficients constitute the effect of diversification for a random average firm. In
general, we observe that firm size, profitability, investments, leverage, and
cash holdings have a positive effect on excess value. Considering the addi-
tional variables from the extended set (Table 6), we discover that dividend
payments have a value increasing effect for focussed firms while this has no
impact on the value of standalones. Being listed in one of the major indices
is suggested to add value.
Selection parameters and selection predictions
In addition, Table 5 and 6 provides the estimates of the selection parame-
ters σj and ρjη, which are needed to explicitly calculate the bias from self-
selection. Please recall that ρjησj = σjη as latter expression is introduced
in our theoretical predictions.11 First, looking at the sign of the statistically
significant selection parameters already reveals the selection quality of the
firms selected into the respective firm type. As σ0η < 0 and σ1η < 0 ap-
plies (due to negative ρ1η and ρ0η), we suggest a negative selection of firms
into diversification, which in turn indicates a positive selection into focusing.
Again, this tells us that diversified firms are worse (discounted) compared
to an average firm in each of both possible firm types. Firms opting against
diversification are better than an average random firm irrespective the firm
type they eventually choose.
With respect to Roy’s (1951) predictions, these results imply that firms
with unobservable productivity below average (Case 3.2) choose to diversify
while realizing their comparative advantage. Accordingly, we expect firms
11The literature (e.g. Campa and Kedia, 2002) often uses λ (lambda) when referring to
the estimates of σ1η.
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with high unobservable productivity to enter the one firm type which offers
the highest expected firm value, which is to focus.
In order to retrieve all necessary information to test the selection regime
‘selection on expected gains’, we have to take a closer look at the magnitude
of the selection parameters. For diversified firms, we have σ1η = −0.111312,
which resembles the estimate by Campa and Kedia (2002): -0.14. For fo-
cussed firms, we yield: σ0η = −0.3995. These parameter magnitudes match
Case 2.3 : σ1η < 0 and σ0η ≪ 0. Though diversified firms are of minor
unobservable productivity, they deliberately self-select into diversification as
they expect a higher gain from this decision than a random comparable firm.
Firms with high unobservable quality do not choose to diversify as their ex-
pected gains are below the one of an average quality firm, i.e. the costs of
diversification exceed the respective gains. The results of the extended model
(Table 6) lead to the same conclusions. To test which of the selection regime
applies in effect, we need to compute and analyze the expected firms val-
ues of the actual and the counterfactual firm type as well as the subsequent
conditional and unconditional gains from diversification.
Conditional and unconditional expected values and gains from di-
versification
Having estimated the parameters of the endogenous switching model, we
now possess all necessary information to compute the different expected ex-
cess values conditional and unconditional upon self-selection by observable
and unobservable characteristics. First, we are interested in the expected
firm values of a random firm with average unobservable firm quality and
average sample characteristics (X), thus with neither a selection issue on
unobservable nor on observable characteristics. Table 7 proves that firms
randomly selected into diversification yield a positive expected excess value
of a) 0.0899 while being randomly assigned to the focused state generates a
negative predicted firm value of b) -0.1069. Consequently, the difference of
0.1968 gives us the unconditional and thus undistorted gain of diversification,
12ρ1ησ1 = σ1η, so that 0.5992× (−0.1858) = −0.1113.
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also referred to as average diversification effect of a random firm (△ATE | X).
This result is close to the estimated coefficient (0.1897) on the diversification
dummy in our IV estimation as well as to the one (0.18) suggested by Campa
and Kedia (2002) by Heckman’s two-step correction method.
[Please insert Table 7 approximately here.]
The same effect for a random firm can be calculated only now allowing
for selection on observables by retrieving the expected values given the ran-
dom firm had i) the average characteristics of diversified firms (X1) versus if
this firm assumed ii) the average firm characteristics of focussed firms (X0).
Though ending up with almost similar diversification gains (0.1985 with X0
vs. 0.1866 with X1), the higher expected value in the diversification state
given the average characteristics of standalones (0.0951 vs 0.0597) and the
correspondingly less negative one in the standalone case (-0.1035 vs. -0.1268)
indicate a more favorable average composition of value driving firm charac-
teristics of focussed firms; i.e. we conclude a negative selection on observables
into diversification.
However, let us turn our attention towards the more comprehensive anal-
ysis regarding the expected firm values and gains conditional upon the selec-
tion on observables and unobservables. Therefore, we estimate the expected
firm values of diversified firms in their chosen state (diversification) as well as
in the counterfactual (focusing) state. According to the lower panel in Table
7 diversified firms trade at a discount of c) -0.0956. The additional analysis
reveals that diversified firms would suffer a more severe discount of d) -0.6842
if they had chosen to stay focused. As a result, these firms gain from diver-
sification by 0.5886, which is the average diversification effect of diversified
firms (△ATT ). To diversify is definitely the better alternative for those firms
with minor unobservable firm productivity, they simply realize their com-
parative advantage. An equivalent analysis is performed for single segment
firms; again, we estimate the expected firm value in the realized firm type
(focussing) as well as what would have been the firm value – everything un-
changed – if they had opted to diversify. Interestingly, we find diversification
to be (hypothetically) value-creating for standalone firms. As by definition
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of the excess value measure, standalones have a zero (e) -0.0067) firm value
in their chosen firm type. However, they expect a positive excess value of
f) 0.1224 in case they diversify and thus would gain from diversification by
0.1290, the so called average diversification gain of standalones (△ATU). If we
just compared the expected firm values in their realized states, c) -0.0956 for
diversified and e) -0.0067 for standalone firms, we would receive a flawed im-
pression on the effect of diversification. This flawed picture is painted when
applying least squares without accounting for selectivity. Our OLS estimate
on the diversification dummy (-0.088) simply reflects the value difference in
the realized firm types c)− e), but not any meaningful average causal effect
of diversification.
The results from the extended specifications (Table 8) completely confirm
the results and conclusions drawn from the base model.
[Please insert Table 8 approximately here.]
Inference on the selection regime
These described outcomes need some further explanation with respect to the
underlying selection mechanism, especially why focussed firms do not select
into the firm type that offers the highest expected firm value. The fact that
standalone firms decided against diversification – though expecting a higher
firm value when doing so – rules out the hypothesis that firms simply follow
the rationale of maximizing their expected firm value. The selection regime
that obviously holds is the ‘selection on expected gains’. As introduced,
firms compare in this framework their expected gains with the gains of a
comparable random firm. As △ATT > △ATE | X1 (0.5886 > 0.1866) clearly
holds, we infer that firms deliberately self-selecting into diversification expect
gains that exceed the corresponding costs of diversification. In contrast, the
expected diversification gains of firms eventually decided to stay focussed
(0.1290) are estimated to be below the expected gains of a comparable ran-
dom firm (0.1985), such that △ATU < △ATE | X0 holds. This suggests that
the expected gains from diversification are lower than the respective costs;
hence, these firms refrain from the decision to diversify.
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4.6 Conclusion
Our study contributes to the conglomerate literature in several ways. One
of the major strengths of this paper is that we provide evidence for hetero-
geneous average effects of diversification, saying that the average effect of
diversification for those firms selected into diversification (△ATT ) is signif-
icantly larger than the average effect on randomly assigned firms (△ATE),
and thus also larger than the hypothetical diversification effect on firms de-
cided to stay focussed (△ATU). This finding opposes the previous belief of
homogenous diversification effects (△ATE = △ATT = △ATU). In turn, the
identification of these heterogeneous effects helps us to shed light on the
question how and why firms self-select into a certain firm type. First of
all, our results confirm a negative self-selection of firms (selection quality)
into diversification – as suggested by the relevant literature (e.g. Campa
and Kedia, 2002). This finding implies that diversified firms are discounted
in each of both possible firm types relative to a comparable random firm.
However, our empirical application of endogenous switching regressions on
a sample of publicly traded US-firms from 1992-2012 reveals that diversified
firms would suffer a significantly stronger discount if they stayed focused.
This finding is in support of those studies that find conglomerates to trade
at a discount even before they diversify (Lang and Stulz, 1994; Graham et al.,
2002; Chevalier, 2004), and thus that diversification leads to a mitigation of
the discount. Moreover, our results even suggest that standalone firms would
gain from diversification. In addition, our results unveil information on the
selection regime since we find strong indication for a selection on expected
gains rather than a sorting into the one firm type that promises the high-
est firm value. Once the gains from diversification exceed the corresponding
costs, firms deliberately select into diversification. Overall, although we also
find some evidence for a selection on observables, we strongly promote the
selection on unobservable firm characteristics to be the major issue when
identifying the average effects of diversification.
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Tables
Table 1: Expected excess values and diversification gains. The diversification
effect (column 3) is the difference between the expected excess value in the diversification
(column 1) and the standalone (column 2) state given Xj , j = 1, 2. X, X1, X0 refers to the
average firm characteristics of the population, firms that diversified and firms chosen to
stay standalone, respectively. The subindex 1 relates to diversified firms, 0 to standalones.
△ATE refers to the gains from the ‘average treatment (diversification) effect’, △ATT to the
gains from the ‘average treatment (diversification) effect of the treated (diversified)’ and
△ATU to the gains from the ‘average treatment (diversification) effect of the untreated
(standalones)’. △DH is the difference in gains from diversification of those eventually cho-
sen to become diversified and standalones (diversification heterogeneity); similarly △FH
refers to the differential between the expected firm value in the focussed state between
diversified and standalone firms (focussing heterogeneity).
Decision stage
To diversify - Not to diversify = Diversification gain
(1) (2) (3)
Random firm (X) (a) X ′itβ1 (b) X
′
itβ0 △ATE | X
Random firm (X1) (a1) X
′
1itβ1 (b1) X
′
1itβ0 △ATE | X1
Random firm (X0) (a0) X
′
0itβ1 (b0) X
′
0itβ0 △ATE | X0
Firms that
(c) X ′1itβ1 + σ1ηλ1it (d) X
′
1itβ0 + σ0ηλ1it △ATTdiversified (X1)
Firms that did
(f) X ′0itβ0 + σ0ηλ0it (e) X
′
0itβ0 + σ0ηλ0it △ATUnot diversify (X0)
Heterogeneity effects △DH △FH
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Table 2: Roy model predictions and sorting mechanisms. Selection according
to highest expected outcome. Sorting (∗) indicates the highest expected firm value
possible to yield and thus the firm type to select in.
Cond. expectations No selection bias Non-hierarchical sorting Hierarchical sorting
Positive selection Negative selection
σ0η = 0 / σ1η = 0 σ0η < 0 / σ1η > 0 σ0η > 0 / σ1η > 0 σ0η < 0 / σ1η < 0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Firms that diversified (X1)
(c) X ′1itβ1 + σ1ηλ1it = X
′
1itβ1 > X
′
1itβ1 > X
′
1itβ1 < X
′
1itβ1
(d) X ′1itβ0 + σ0ηλ1it = X
′
1itβ0 < X
′
1itβ0 > X
′
1itβ0 < X
′
1itβ0
Sorting Random (c)∗ > (d) (c)∗ > (d) (c)∗ > (d)
Firms that did not diversify (X0)
(e) X ′0itβ0 + σ0ηλ0it = X
′
0itβ0 > X
′
0itβ0 < X
′
0itβ0 > X
′
0itβ0
(f) X ′0itβ1 + σ1ηλ0it = X
′
0itβ1 < X
′
0itβ1 < X
′
0itβ1 > X
′
0itβ1
Sorting Random (e)∗ > (f) (e)∗ > (f) (e)∗ > (f)
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Table 5: Parameter estimates of diversification decision and excess value equa-
tions. Reduced set of control variables. Model 1 (Pooled OLS) and model 2 (Panel
IV) are estimated by least squares. The panel IV is calculated by two-stage least squares
(2SLS) with random effects (RE). Only the estimates of the second stage of the IV re-
gression are reported. The endogenous switching model (column 4-6) is estimated by
full maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) where the parameters of the selection (DIV
= 1/0) and the excess value (EV ) equations (EV: DIV; EV: FOC) are simultaneously
estimated. DIV refers to diversified firms, FOC to focussed firms. We use a reduced
set of controls: The dummy variable D assumes the value 1 when the firm operates in
multisegments (DIV ), 0 otherwise (FOC). Firm size (Log of total assets) is the natural
logarithm of total assets reported. EBIT / sales is the ration EBIT to sales. CAPEX /
sales is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. Cash / TA is cash and cash equivalents
over total assets. Exogenous variables suggested to meet the exclusion restrictions for the
identification of the IV and the endogenous switching regressions are PSDIV, PNDIV and
Minority interest. Please note that ρjησj = σjη with j = 1, 0. Standard errors shown in
brackets are clustered at firm level. ***/**/* denotes the statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
Pooled OLS Panel IV Endogenous switching regression
VARIABLES EV EV DIV = 1/0 EV: DIV EV: FOC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D -0.0880*** 0.1897***
(0.018) (0.059)
Log of total assets 0.1046*** 0.0995*** 0.1220*** 0.0771*** 0.0904***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.005)
EBIT / sales 0.1127*** 0.0632*** 0.0573 0.2588*** 0.1055***
(0.020) (0.006) (0.070) (0.094) (0.021)
CAPEX / sales 0.4908*** 0.3535*** -0.5165*** 0.8371*** 0.5618***
(0.029) (0.016) (0.107) (0.144) (0.033)
Leverage 0.1857*** 0.0960*** -0.0788 0.1745** 0.1936***
(0.042) (0.013) (0.059) (0.069) (0.048)
Cash / TA 1.3825*** 1.1790*** -0.6068*** 1.4436*** 1.4873***
(0.035) (0.020) (0.107) (0.110) (0.041)
PNDIV 3.3353***
(0.258)
PSDIV 0.1491
(0.118)
Minority interest 0.0967**
(0.045)
σj 0.5992*** 0.6708***
(0.017) (0.016)
ρjη -0.1858** -0.5956***
(0.078) (0.109)
Constant -1.5679*** -1.3527*** -3.1261*** -1.2494*** -1.5174***
(0.053) (0.040) (0.158) (0.176) (0.059)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 48,100 47,236 47,236 7026 40210
R-squared 0.178 0.139
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Table 6: Parameter estimates of diversification decision and excess value equa-
tions. Extended set of control variables. Model 1 (Pooled OLS) and model 2 (Panel IV) are
estimated by least squares. The panel IV is calculated by two-stage least squares (2SLS) with random effects (RE). Only
the estimates of the second stage of the IV regression are reported. The endogenous switching model (column 4-6) is
estimated by full maximum likelihood estimation (FIML) where the parameters of the selection (DIV = 1/0) and the
excess value (EV ) equations (EV: DIV; EV: FOC) are simultaneously estimated. DIV refers to diversified firms, FOC to
focussed firms. We use a reduced set of controls: The dummy variable D assumes the value 1 when the firm operates in
multisegments (DIV ), 0 otherwise (FOC). Firm size (Log of total assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets reported.
EBIT / sales is the ration EBIT to sales. CAPEX / sales is the ratio of capital expenditures to sales. Cash / TA is cash
and cash equivalents over total assets; majorix indicates the listing in major index; PNDIV fraction of diversified firms
in the major industry segment; PSDIV fraction of industry sales accounted by diversified firms. Exogenous variables
suggested to meet the exclusion restrictions for the identification of the IV and the endogenous switching regressions are
PSDIV, PNDIV and Minority interest. Please note that ρjησj = σjη with j = 1, 0. Standard errors shown in brackets
are clustered at firm level. ***/**/* denotes the statistical significance at the 1%/5%/10% level.
Pooled OLS Panel IV Endogenous switching regression
VARIABLES EV EV DIV = 1/0 EV: DIV EV: FOC
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
D -0.0826*** 0.1795***
(0.023) (0.062)
Log of total assets 0.8851*** 0.7695*** -0.1898 0.5035*** 0.9326***
(0.048) (0.029) (0.144) (0.103) (0.056)
EBIT / sales 0.0284** 0.0242*** -0.0139 0.2724*** 0.0772***
(0.013) (0.007) (0.047) (0.085) (0.022)
CAPEX / sales 0.2069*** 0.2971*** -0.2407** 0.3370*** 0.3153***
(0.024) (0.018) (0.101) (0.118) (0.027)
Leverage 0.2612*** 0.1429*** 0.0813 0.2400*** 0.2747***
(0.031) (0.016) (0.101) (0.072) (0.034)
Cash / TA 1.1156*** 1.0282*** -0.4437*** 1.3883*** 1.4181***
(0.037) (0.023) (0.126) (0.118) (0.043)
Squared log of TA -0.0167*** -0.0134*** 0.0079 -0.0039 -0.0186***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002)
Log of TA (1 lag) -0.2134*** -0.2361*** -0.0442 -0.1274*** -0.2060***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.033) (0.042) (0.022)
EBIT / sales (1 lag) -0.0023 -0.0049 0.0802 0.1084 0.0107
(0.011) (0.006) (0.082) (0.087) (0.015)
CAPEX / sales (1 lag) 0.0993*** 0.1240*** -0.2426*** 0.2576*** 0.1650***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.093) (0.093) (0.023)
Log of TA (2 lag) -0.1624*** -0.1315*** 0.0967*** -0.2340*** -0.1747***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.034) (0.035) (0.014)
EBIT / sales (2 lag) 0.0103 0.0091 0.0920 0.0826 0.0158
(0.009) (0.006) (0.070) (0.086) (0.012)
CAPEX / sales (2 lag) 0.0681*** 0.0781*** -0.2203** 0.2787** 0.1124***
(0.017) (0.015) (0.091) (0.123) (0.022)
Dummy dividend payout 0.0904*** 0.0383*** 0.1975*** -0.0009 0.0450**
(0.018) (0.009) (0.046) (0.038) (0.021)
Majorix 0.1479*** 0.2331*** 0.1383** 0.2109*** 0.1522***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.058) (0.045) (0.023)
PNDIV 3.2560***
(0.291)
PSDIV 0.2128
(0.132)
Minority interest 0.0976*
(0.051)
σj 0.5732*** 0.6285**
(0.020) (0.018)
ρjη -0.1957** -0.5361***
(0.088) (0.136)
Constant -4.1228*** -3.5207*** -1.1542 -1.5533** -4.4880***
(0.297) (0.186) (0.902) (0.708) (0.340)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 37,515 36,805 36,805 5780 31025
R-squared 0.232 0.209
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Table 7: Linearly predicted excess values using estimates of endogenous switch-
ing regressions: Diversification and heterogeneity gains. Reduced specification
model. Multisegment firms identified on SIC2. Diversification gain (column 3) as dif-
ference between (column 1) and (column 2) is measured by difference in means. Stan-
dard errors are shown in brackets. ***/**/* denotes the statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
Decision stage
Obs. To diversify Not to diversify Diversification gain
(1) (2) (3)
Random firm (X) 47236 (a) 0.0899 (b) -0.1069 0.1968***
(0.346) (0.320) (0.000)
Random firm (X1) 7026 (a1) 0.0597 (b1) -0.1268 0.1866***
(0.003) (0.250) (0.001)
Random firm (X0) 40210 (a0) 0.0951 (b0) -0.1035 0.1985***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000)
Firms that
7026
(c) -0.0956 (d) -0.6842 0.5886***
diversified (X1) (0.259) (0.304) (0.002)
Firms that did
40210
(f) 0.1224 (e) -0.0067 0.1290***
not diversify (X0) (0.358) (0.328) (0.001)
Heterogeneity effects 47236 -0.2179*** -0.6775***
(0.004) (0.004)
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Table 8: Linearly predicted excess values using estimates of endogenous switch-
ing regressions: Diversification and heterogeneity gains. Extended specifica-
tion model. Multisegment firms identified on SIC2. Diversification gain (column 3) as
difference between (column 1) and (column 2) is measured by difference in means. Stan-
dard errors are shown in brackets. ***/**/* denotes the statistical significance at the
1%/5%/10% level.
Decision stage
Obs. To diversify Not to diversify Diversification gain
(1) (2) (3)
Random firm (X) 36805 0.0674 -0.1218 0.1894***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Random firm (X1) 31025 0.0495 -0.1341 0.1837***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001)
Random firm (X0) 5780 0.0707 -0.1197 0.1905***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Firms that
5780
-0.1036 -0.5941 0.4906***
diversified (X1) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
Firms that did
31025
0.0995 -0.0340 0.1334***
not diversify (X0) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Heterogeneity effects 36805 0.2031*** 0.5601***
(0.005) (0.005)
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